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Article
THE MONSANTO LECTURE
ONLINE DEFAMATION, LEGAL CONCEPTS,
AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
I. INTRODUCTION
It was an honor to give the Monsanto Lecture at Valparaiso University
Law School. Many prior Monsanto lecturers have utilized this
opportunity to sketch important theoretical frameworks. I have chosen to
go in a different direction, one that is studiously down-to-earth. The
Article principally addresses questions regarding the publication element
of the tort of libel and how the doctrine surrounding those questions
ought to be applied to defamation cases that involve the Internet. Most of
today's interesting problems in American defamation law involve a
question about the interaction of a federal statutory provision, the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA") § 230(c), with the common law of
libel. I argue that the failure to take the doctrinal structure of libel law
seriously has led courts to mangle Internet defamation law, effectively
eliminating - for the Internet only - a fundamental principle called "the
republication rule."' This interpretation is alien from what Congress
intended, from any reasonable reading of the relevant statutory text and
from plausible public policy choices in the age of the Internet. As Ninth
Circuit Judge Ronald Gould cautioned:
Congress wanted to ensure that excessive government
regulation did not slow America's expansion into the
exciting new frontier of the Internet. But Congress did
not want this new frontier to be like the Old West: a
lawless zone governed by retribution and mob justice.
The CDA does not license anarchy. A person's decision
Professor of Law and James H. Quinn '49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham University
School of Law. I am grateful to Anita Bernstein, Mark Geistfeld, John Goldberg, Clare
Huntington, Thomas H. Lee, Ethan Leib, Robert Rabin, Aaron Saiger, Anthony Sebok,
Catherine Sharkey, Kevin Stack, Olivier Sylvain, and audiences at Valparaiso University Law
School and University of Western Ontario for helpful comments on previous drafts. Auran
Buckles has provided tremendous research assistance.
1 47 US.C. § 230(c) (2012).
1
2 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.51
to disseminate the rankest rumor or most blatant
falsehood should not escape legal redress merely because
the person chose to disseminate it through the Internet
rather than through some other medium.2
This Article aims to set things right in a somewhat traditional way: it
elucidates a legal problem by identifying the relevant doctrinal
framework within tort law, and it applies that doctrinal framework to the
real world of facts and statutes and politics. Its principal thesis is that
§ 230 of the CDA-which is called "Protection for 'Good Samaritan'
blocking and screening of offensive material" -should be interpreted
against the backdrop of both: (1) a variety of principles regarding the
publication element of libel law; and (2) the numerous Good Samaritan
statutes that have been enacted to modify the common law's treatment of
the "duty" element within state negligence law. Like certain parts of
negligence law, CDA § 230 ("§ 230") relates to whether a company or
individual ever has a duty to protect persons against perils that it (the
company or individual) did not itself generate. A striking decision by a
single state trial court in the early 1990s caused a panic in the fledgling
Internet industry because it seemed to create a common law Catch-22 for
Internet service providers who try to protect families against obscenity on
the Internet.3 Congress solved the problem with § 230 just the way that
state legislatures have used Good Samaritan laws to eliminate the Catch-
22 for physicians who volunteer to rescue roadside accident victims.
Notwithstanding what seems to be a direct message from Congress in the
very naming of the statute, it turns out to have been difficult for courts
and commentators alike to grasp its main point. I am hopeful that, as a
scholar who studies the range of tort law-from negligence to strict
products liability to battery, fraud, and defamation-I may be able to shed
light on this important question of statutory interpretation. The
unjustifiable abandonment of the republication rule for Internet cases is a
consequence of courts' failure to grasp the "Good Samaritan" aspects of
§ 230 and the concepts of affirmative duty that such a framework imports
into libel law.
While friends and colleagues will not be surprised by my decision to
focus on libel law in this Article (defamation and privacy within tort law
2 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir.) (Gould, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), rehearing denied, 351 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085
(2004) (holding that a republisher was immune under the Communications Decency Act
("CDA") § 230).
3 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (treating the Internet service provider ("ISP") as the publisher
of a defamatory posting by a third party).
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have long been a personal passion), some would be incredulous if I
disclaimed all theoretical pretensions. They would be at least partially
right, for the theoretical positions I have advocated over the past two
decades do lie behind the interpretive arguments I put forward here. In
the end, I shall suggest that the problems courts have faced in CDA
interpretation are symptoms of larger shortcomings in the theoretical and
methodological assumptions that many judges and lawyers today bring
to their analysis of legal questions. Sorting out § 230 requires taking legal
concepts seriously: publication, active/passive distinctions, Good
Samaritan ideas, affirmative duties, republication, and so on. Twentieth
century tort scholars gave American judges and lawyers one hundred
years of anti-conceptual thinking, often contending that pragmatic thinkers
should zip through the verbiage of the common law and get to the results
that really matter. The larger point of this Article is that reasonable and
pragmatic legal interpretations often require just the opposite - an
authentic engagement with common law principles and an intelligent
construction of the case law and statutory provisions that emerge from
and complement those principles. In pointing out a wide range of tort
claims that have been inadvertently snuffed out, I also aim to call attention
to the importance of tort law as a mechanism through which individuals
are afforded an avenue of civil recourse against those who wronged them.
To some extent, then, the Article illustrates the pragmatic conceptualist
and civil recourse views I have put forward over the past two decades,
both individually and in conjunction with Professor John Goldberg. 4
Nothing here depends on acceptance of those theoretical views, however.5
Part II provides the background of our topic. 6 Part II.A briefly
introduces the republication rule. Next, Part II.B describes the key case -
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy- that led to the enactment of § 230. Then Part
II.C describes a path of decisions interpreting the CDA, leading us to a
4 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457,458-59
(2000) [hereinafter Zipursky, Pragmatic] (introducing pragmatic conceptualism); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1, 82 (1998)
(introducing civil recourse theory); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral
of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1733, 1746-50 (1998) (developing responsibility-based,
pragmatic, and conceptualistic accounts of the common law of torts, in the spirit of Cardozo
as opposed to Holmes); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths about Tort Law, 42 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1221, 1256 (2008) (providing the Monsanto lecture touching upon pragmatic,
conceptualistic, and responsibility-based themes in tort law).
5 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Thinking in the Box in Legal Scholarship: The Good Samaritan and
Internet Libel, 56 J. LEG. ED. 55 (2016). In a recent essay for a symposium on the future of legal
scholarship, I suggested that doctrinal and non-theoretical legal scholarship is too often
overlooked. Id. That essay puts forward a highly condensed version of the CDA § 230
("§ 230") analysis offered below.
6 See infra Part II (reviewing multiple cases).
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strikingly laissez-faire approach. Finally, Part II.D sketches where we are
today in Internet libel law.7 Part Ell explains that American courts have
been interpreting § 230 without an adequate understanding of either the
common law doctrines relating to the publication element of libel law or
an adequate understanding of the Stratton Oakmont decision.8 These
lacunae have led to a catastrophe in interpreting and applying § 230 since
its passage.9
Part IV uses the framework developed above to explain what has gone
wrong in the interpretation of the § 230 and why, and Part IV offers an
account of how that statute should be interpreted moving forward.10 Part
V concludes by returning to the more theoretical theme of the Article-
that legal concepts matter.11
II. ONINE DEFAMATION AN) THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE REPUBLICATION
RULE
A. The Republication Rule
For centuries, the common law of libel and slander contained a
principle called "the republication rule."' 2 It says that a speaker who
writes or speaks a defamatory statement made by another is liable as if he
or she were the speaker herself.13 As a general matter, it is immaterial
whether the second speaker is reasserting the defamatory statement in her
own voice or attributing it to the earlier speaker.' 4 Imagine a newspaper
that publishes an op-ed by a Mr. Jim Smith saying "Clint Williams is a
child molester," or a neighborhood gossip who says, "Jim Smith said
'Clint Williams is a child molester."' The newspaper and the
neighborhood gossips are, as a general matter, on the hook as if they were
Jim Smith.
The reasons for the republication rule are obvious.1 5 It is not simply
that the same damage can be done to the plaintiff by the republisher
7 See infra Part II (detailing the background of the tort of defamation).
8 See infra Part III (analyzing the courts' interpretations of § 230).
9 See infra Part III (noting the impact of various interpretations of § 230).
10 See infra Part IV (recommending a better method of interpretation).
11 See infra Part V (discussing legal concepts and the common law).
12 See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating
republishing libel may create liability even when the statement is attributed to another
publisher).
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORIS § 578(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (summarizing the
liability of those repeating defamatory statements).
14 See id. ("It is not defense that the second publisher names the author or original
publisher of the libel.").
15 See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (" [tialebearers are as bad as
talemakers") (internal citations omitted).
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(actually, often far greater harm is done by the repetition or the broad
publication). 16 It is that, absent such a rule, defamers could too easily
sidestep any possible liability by putting words into another's mouth.
And remember that speaking or writing - including republication - is an
intentional act, so republishers are aware when they are making the
damaging statements. An assailant does not avoid liability for battery
because the idea was someone else's and he was merely carrying through
another's intention.1 7
To be sure, common law courts and legislatures have crafted
intelligent limitations on the republication rule in cases where, for
example, a newspaper is carrying a report of what was said in a city
council meeting or a court. 8 And, under the inspiration of New York Times
v. Sullivan and its progeny, federal and state courts interpreting the First
Amendment have created defenses that, directly or indirectly, blunt the
impact of the republication rule in a range of cases, too.19 But-for the
most part-the republication rule has remained in place before, during,
and after the New York Times v. Sullivan era, and it remains in place today.2 0
B. Cubby, Stratton Oakmont, and the Communications Decency Act
Things have gone differently for Internet defamation, however. In
New York, California, and several federal circuits, the republication rule
has been eviscerated." A person who posts a defamatory statement that
was originally written by someone else is typically said to enjoy complete
immunity from a defamation claim, even if the poster had actual malice,
and regardless of whether it is an issue of public concern." On the
Internet, the law of defamation (and various other speech torts, as well)
has been sheared away for republishers, regardless of culpability,
16 See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 61 (reasoning any different rule would generate expansive
reputational harm without liability).
17 See Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1148-50 (emphasizing the amount of authority stating that
republishers should be held liable like the originator of the defamatory statement).
18 See, e.g., Swede v. Passaic Daily News, 153 A.2d 36 (N.J. 1959) (recognizing the defense
of fairly and accurately reporting statement made in town meeting); see also e.g., Hahn v.
Holum, 162 N.W. 432 (Wis. 1917) (shielding the true and fair reporting of official proceeding).
19 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 710,739 (1964).
20 See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, "Defamation Live": The Confusing Legal
Landscape of Republication in Live Broadcasting and a Call for a "Breaking News Doctrine", 39
COLuM. J.L. & ARms 497 (2016) (recognizing the persistence of the republication rule and
calling for revision of doctrine with regard to live broadcasts).
21 Infra Parts II.C and II.D.
2 See, e.g., infra Part II.D. (describing breadth of protection in today's Internet law).
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knowledge, intention, or effect, and regardless of whether the original
defamer can be found.23
Two cases from New York began the sequence of events that brought
us to where we are. The first-Cubby v. Compuserve-was quite
unremarkable. 24 A plaintiff sued an Internet service provider because one
of the virtual periodicals carried in its online libraries allegedly contained
a statement defaming the plaintiff.25 Judge Peter Leisure, in the Southern
District of New York, determined that Compuserve was more like a
library, bookstore, or newsstand than a newspaper, and summed this up
by saying Compuserve was more like a distributor than a publisher.26
Distributors - unlike publishers - cannot be held accountable in libel for
the contents of writings they lend, sell, or distribute, at least if they lack
notice of its defamatory content.27 Judge Leisure, therefore, granted
Compuserve's summary judgment motion on the ground that it was not
a publisher.2 8
Two years later, a controversial securities brokerage firm sued the
internet service provider ("ISP") Prodigy in a New York state trial court
in Nassau County on Long Island.29 An electronic bulletin board carried
on Prodigy contained a pseudonymous posting asserting the securities
brokerage was engaged in fraud." The plaintiff's lawyers in this case were
not deterred by Cubby because they had found overstated marketing
material by Prodigy in which it touted its ability to filter and edit content,
23 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328-30 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to hold an
online publisher liable for defamation or negligence, even though the original defamer could
not be found).
24 See generally Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(illustrating that an action was brought for libel, business disparagement, and unfair
competition).
2 See id. at 137-38 (describing the nature of the plaintiff's defamation claim).
26 See id. at 139-40 (finding CompuServe was not a publisher).
2 See id. at 139 (explaining the higher standard of liability for publishers as opposed to
distributors).
2 See id. at 135, 145 (holding CompuServe functioned more like a distributor than a
publisher).
2 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. CL May 24,1995) (noting the cause of action); see also Second Amended Verified
Complaint at 2-3, Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (stating Stratton Oakmont's president, Daniel
Porush, was also a named plaintiff, and the named defendants included: IBM, Sears
Roebuck, alleged partners of Prodigy, and unidentified defendants, John Doe and Mary
Doe). The allegations in this complaint included assertions that unidentified employees of
Prodigy were the users of the pseudonyms through which the postings were made; these
allegations had been abandoned by the time Stratton Oakmont made its motion for partial
summary judgment. Id.
3 See id. at 3 (claiming unidentified individuals made a pseudonymous posting asserting
that Stratton Oakmont had committed fraud).
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thereby declaring itself family-friendly.31 The firm aggressively
characterized Prodigy as having admitted that it was - within the rubric
of Cubby - a publisher, not a distributor.32 Moreover, Stratton Oakmont
was able to point to the fact that Prodigy had actually hired someone to
monitor the bulletin board on which the allegedly defamatory statement
appeared, and that this person had failed to remove the statement." So
confident was Stratton Oakmont-notwithstanding a prominent federal
court having ruled as a matter of law for the defendant in the only similar
case - that it moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether
Prodigy could be held liable if the statement was found defamatory.M
Stunningly, the trial judge in New York State court granted partial
summary judgment, ruling that Prodigy was a publisher, as a matter of
law, of statements that had been anonymously posted on its electronic
bulletin board.? Even though Prodigy hired new lawyers and moved for
reconsideration, it was too late, for the trial judge was unwilling to change
his mind.3
It is, of course, not technically relevant that the controversial securities
firm protecting its reputation in Prodigy was none other than Stratton
Oakmont, best known today as the firm that was run by Jordan Belfort -
the so-called "Wolf of Wall Street."37 We now know that public statements
critical of Stratton Oakmont were sorely missing in 1994.3 It is more than
a touch ironic that Stratton Oakmont's right to protect its reputation is the
source of American Internet defamation law today.39
The ISP industry rushed to Washington in the weeks after Justice
Stuart Ain's decision, energetically lobbying Congress for federal
protection against state judges like Ain. 0 Congress devoted a provision
31 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4-5 (describing Stratton Oakmont's
ability to filter and edit content).
32 See id. at *4 (following the rubric of Cubby).
3 See id. at *5-6 (explaining how Prodigy directed and controlled Epstein's actions).
See id. at *1 (moving for partial summary judgment).
M See id. at *4 (granting Stratton Oakmont's motion for partial summary judgment).
36 See id. at *1-2 (denying Prodigy's motion for renewal).
3 See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at 1 (denoting Stratton Oakmont as the plaintiff
in the case); id. (establishing Stratton Oakmont as a party to the lawsuit); see also JORDAN
BELFORT, THE WOLF OF WALL STREET, 15 (2007) (detailing Jordan Belfort's efforts in
establishing the brokerage firm Stratton Oakmont). The film version of the book - The Wolf
of Wall Street-was a Hollywood blockbuster starring Leonardo DiCaprio.
3 See BELFORT, supra note 37, at 54-55 (implying Stratton Oakmont had a good reputation
among many individuals in the early 1990s).
9 See Conor Clarke, How the Wolf of Wall Street Created the Internet, SLATE (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news andthestratton-oakmontruhling that-helpedwri
te.html [https://perma.cc/HT2W-KG8D] (reporting Stratton Oakmont initiated a lawsuit
that laid the legal foundation for governing Internet content).
4 See id. (describing the reaction to the Stratton Oakmont decision in Washington).
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of its then-in-progress telecommunications bill to overrule this little New
York case and to make sure it was not followed nationally.41 One of the
concerns quite rightly raised was that it was unrealistic to expect ISPs to
review all of the postings on all of its bulletin boards and to determine
which were true or false, defamatory or non-defamatory, and published
negligently or not.4 2 Another was that a pattern of massive filtering and
taking down of messages by ISPs-particularly if done in a defensive
spirit-would hold back the Internet from fulfilling its potential and
would represent a move in the wrong direction from a First Amendment
point of view.4 Most specifically, Congress was profoundly troubled by
the New York trial court's willingness to treat the defendant as sort of
"estopped" by its own partial censorship from pleading an inability to
control what was online.44 The problem was that companies would
therefore make sure to refrain from any form of control of obscenity. 45 For
all of these reasons, Congress inserted into the CDA what it called the
"Good Samaritan" provision:
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and
screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of--
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected; or
41 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012) (codifying the language of the bill's final draft).
4 See Clarke, supra note 39 (expressing Congress's concerns over the Stratton Oakmont
ruling).
u See CDA 230: Legislative History, ELEc. FRONRI FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/
cda230/legislative-history [https:/ /perma.cc/7LDY-T4LR] (discussing additional concerns
from Congress over ISP liability).
See id. (referring to the Cox-Wyden Amendment to the CDA that was proposed in
response to Congress's concerns).
4 See id. (noting the CDA was passed, in part, in the interest of children's safety).
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(B) any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).46
The CDA was passed into law in 1996. Although certain portions of
it were struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, § 230(c) remains good law.47 In the past twenty years, it
has been applied in scores of cases to undercut not only claims for
defamation, but other common law tort speech claims -such as invasion
of privacy -as well as a variety of state and federal statutory claims that
sought to impose liability on an Internet provider for speech conduct by
Internet users that violates some state or federal law.4 8 The word
"immunity" does not appear in § 230(c), but courts across the nation
routinely say that it creates a federal immunity for Internet service
providers and users with regard to content provided by others. 49 The U.S.
Supreme Court has never issued an opinion interpreting the meaning,
scope, or applicability of § 230(c).5
C. Zeran, Batzel, and Barrett
The most widely cited opinion interpreting § 230 is Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., penned by Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit shortly after the CDA
became law.5 Zeran's facts are remarkable. 52 On April 25, 1995, an
unknown person posted an advertisement on an America Online, Inc.
("AOL") bulletin board for "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts," indicating that
those interested in acquiring such a T-shirt should call "Ken" at a phone
number that was provided.? The phone number belonged to the plaintiff,
Kenneth Zeran, who was incontrovertibly neither the person posting the
advertisement nor a person in any way involved in making or selling such
46 § 230(c)(1)-(2).
47 See 521 U.S. 844, 979 (1997) (holding that certain portions of the CDA should be
invalidated).
See generally, JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY Acr: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM PROPOSALS 22-35 (2012)
(surveying cases involving range of substantive causes of action for which § 230 protection
has been sought).
4 See Chi. Lawyers' Comn'n for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing several courts that have taken the "immunity" position).
5 See § 230(c) (reflecting the absence of Supreme Court opinions on § 230(c)).
51 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,328 (4th Cir. 1997).
52 See id. at 328-29 (highlighting the facts of the case).
5 See id. at 329 (summarizing the details of the hoax that plagued Ken Zeran).
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T-shirts. The point of the anonymous poster's hoax was evidently to cause
Zeran to be harassed by people believing him to be horrifyingly tasteless
and insensitive.5 The alleged T-shirt slogans were startlingly offensive:
they made tasteless jokes about the Oklahoma City bombing of a federal
building, which killed 168 persons (including nineteen children) less than
one week earlier.55 In essence, the posting characterizing Zeran as trying
to make money by selling shirts with slogans such as "Visit
Oklahoma . .. It's a BLAST!!!," "Putting the kids to bed ... Oklahoma
1995," and "McVeigh for President 1996."s6 Zeran received hundreds of
angry calls per day, including death threats.57 He contacted AOL,
demanding that the posting be taken down, but AOL refused to do so.M
The problem was exacerbated when an Oklahoma City radio station
learned of the posting (but did not learn that it was a hoax).59 Zeran
brought a tort claim against AOL for the reputational harm and emotional
distress caused by its failure to remove the defamatory postings.60 AOL
asserted that the CDA protected it from liability, and the case went to the
Fourth Circuit.61
Zeran argued as follows: even if one assumes that § 230 shields AOL
from being treated like Prodigy was treated in Stratton Oakmont, his claim
should still move forward because it is fundamentally different in kind
from Stratton Oakmont's. 62 Stratton Oakmont insisted that Prodigy be
treated like the New York Times - as a publisher, and the trial judge had
agreed to do so." Section 230 forbids courts from following that lead,
Zeran conceded, but that is irrelevant, because he wished to hold AOL
responsible as a distributor, not as a publisher.M Recall that Cubby
indicated that Compuserve could not be held liable as a distributor
See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAw 226 (2001)
(speculating as to the goals of the hoax).
5 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
5 See Zeran v. Diamond Broad., Inc., 203 F3d. 714, 717 (10th Cir. 2000) (naming some of
the offensive phrases advertised in the scam).
5 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (describing the nature of Zeran's harassment).
See id. (summarizing Zeran's interaction with America Online, Inc. ("AOL")).
9 See id. (describing how Zeran's predicament worsened after KRXO asked listeners to
call his number, unaware of the underlying hoax).
6 See Zeran, 203 F.3d at 335 (affirming summary judgment for the radio station on all of
plaintiff's claims; defamation was classified as slander per quod, requiring proof of special
damages).
61 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (summarizing AOUs CDA argument).
62 See id. at 331-34 (reiterating Zeran's rebuttal to AOL's argument).
63 See Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710, at *2, *4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (explaining how Prodigy commanded and controlled Epstein's
actions).
6 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (summarizing Zeran's argument against AOL).
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because it lacked proper notice.6s Stratton Oakmont shifted categories and
demanded that Prodigy be held liable as a publisher. Zeran's principal
argument was still on the distributor side. The CDA, Zeran argued, was
silent as to distributor liability.66
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson rejected Zeran's argument, insisting that
Congress was not using the term "publisher" so narrowly in the CDA.67
Its point was that ISP's like AOL and Prodigy should be immune from
lawsuits aiming to hold them liable for the defamatory comments posted
by others.6 8 When it prohibits courts from treating ISP's as "publishers"
of information content provided by others, it is not simply saying that the
newspaper-publisher or book-publisher doctrinal box shall not be used.69
It is negating any doctrinal box that could be said to function under state
(or federal) law to render ISPs liable for the harm inflicted by the
defamatory posting of another.70 Trying to use a state law distributor-box
to generate ISP liability is, therefore, also preempted by § 230.7 At least
as to defamation claims, Zeran is accepted by American jurisdictions today
without exception.72
In some ways the most important cases in my basic story are Batzel v.
Smith, rendered by a panel of the Ninth Circuit in 2003, and Barrett v.
Rosenthal, decided by the California Supreme Court in 2006.7 Batzel, a
California attorney, sued Tom Cremers, an Amsterdam-based expert in
art museum security, for posting defamatory statements about her on a
listserve and website.74 The statements themselves were written by Smith,
a building contractor and handyman who had worked for Batzel in her
house.? Smith's e-mail suggested that he had evidence that Batzel was a
6 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding
CompuServe was not a distributor).
66 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (stating Zeran's argument).
67 See id. at 334 (interpreting Congress's intended scope of the word "publisher").
68 See id. (explaining the purpose of the CDA); see also 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) (2012) (providing
the actual language of the act).
6 See cf. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-32 (continuing to interpret the § 230(c) as it pertains to
publishers).
7 See id. at 331-34 (barring state and local claims of defamation under the § 230(c)).
See id. at 334 (reaffirming that a state claim cannot be brought under the distributor
theory).
n See Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014)
(characterizing the converging position of the CDA); but see Fair Hous. Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to
extend immunity to a federal housing discrimination claim).
7 See generally Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.), rehearing denied, 351 F.3d 904
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
7 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1018-26 (discussing the parties and nature of the defamation
claim).
7 See id. at 1021 (identifying Bob Smith as the originator of the defamatory comments).
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descendant of the Nazi Heinrich Himmler and that Batzel possessed
valuable art that was stolen from Jews during World War II.76 Smith had
(allegedly) sent his e-mail to art-security expert Cremers so that he could
investigate these allegations, but Cremers (allegedly) believed that Smith
intended him to circulate the allegations on the listserve.7
Cremers asserted he was entitled to § 230(c) protection from Batzel's
defamation claim on the ground that he was merely posting information
provided by another content provider -Smith.78 Batzel retorted that
Cremers actually circulated and posted the defamatory e-mail letter; this
was not a case of failure to remove another's statement from a website, for
Smith had not posted his statement, but merely e-mailed it to Cremers.79
Notwithstanding a strong dissent, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel
accepted Cremers's argument and applied § 230(c)'s protection to
Cremers." Writing for herself and one other member of the panel, Judge
Marsha Berzon stated:
Such a distinction between deciding to publish only some
of the material submitted and deciding not to publish
some of the material submitted is not a viable one. The
scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the
publisher approaches the selection process as one of
inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method
or degree, not substance. A distinction between
removing an item once it has appeared on the Internet
and screening before publication cannot fly either.81
Although the panel technically remanded Batzel's case for a finding on
what Cremers would reasonably have believed Smith's intent to have
been, Cremers was ultimately granted summary judgment.82
The plaintiff in Barrett was Dr. Timothy Polevoy, a Canadian
physician and host of a website purporting to expose fraudulent claims
about medicine and healthcare?3 The defendant was Ilena Rosenthal,
head of a women's healthcare foundation and operator of a website
devoted to women's health, and her posting was an article by publicist
76 See id. (highlighting the specific statements made in Bob Smith's email).
7 See id. at 1022.
78 See id. at 1034-35.
7 See id. at 1035.
so See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035.
81 Id. at 1032 (emphasis in original).
82 See Batzel v. Smith, 372 F. Supp. 2d 546, 547 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (entering summary
judgment for Cremers against Batzel on procedural grounds unrelated to the merits).
83 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (introducing the plaintiff of the
case).
2016] Online Defamation 13
Tim Bolen that criticized the plaintiff Polevoy." The article asserted that
Polevoy had engaged in the crime of stalking women, including the
alleged repeated stalking of a prominent Canadian radio personality.8s
Rosenthal posted Bolen's allegedly defamatory article on two websites
(neither was her own).86 Before the California Supreme Court, she
contended that § 230 shielded her from liability because she had posted
information content that was wholly provided by another (Bolen).8 7 In
response to the plaintiff's argument that she was herself an active poster
of a defamatory statement, not simply an ISP or website on which a
defamatory post had been made by another, the California Supreme Court
noted that the text of the CDA covers ISP "users" not simply ISPs.88 And
as to the argument that posting a message is different from failing to
remove one, the Court followed Batzel, holding that "no logical distinction
can be drawn between a defendant who actively selects information for
publication and one who screens submitted material, removing offensive
content."89 More broadly, the Court determined that "[a] user who
actively selects and posts material based on its content fits well within the
traditional role of 'publisher.'"90 Reasoning that "Congress exempted that
'publisher' role from liability,'" the Court concluded that Rosenthal was
fully protected by § 230(c).9 1
D. Today's Online Libel Law
Before examining the legacy of Batzel and Barrett in particular, it is
worth repeating that this Article directly addresses only a slice of § 230-
that which relates to defamation law.92 Many of the most notable cases
involve sexual assault, child prostitution, housing discrimination, and a
variety of matters quite distant from libel law.93 Just as ambitious
plaintiffs have sought to hold ISPs liable for defamatory statements posted
through the ISP, so they have sought to hold websites or apps liable for
discriminatory housing or child prostitution advertisements placed
through the website or fraudulent solicitations for sexual activity through
8 See id. (describing the defendant in the case).
85 See id. at 531 (describing the crime that the plaintiff had allegedly committed).
8 See id. at 514 (providing that Rosenthal posted the article to two websites promoting the
politics of medicine).
87 See id. at 527 (expanding on the argument of § 230 granting her immunity from liability).
8 See id. at 526 (defining the term "user" under § 230(b)(3)).
89 Barrett, 146 P.3d at 528.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 528-29.
92 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (discussing how § 230 relates to defamation law).
93 See generally, REIDENBERG ET AL., supra note 48 (discussing the cases where § 230
protection was sought).
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the website.94 And just as ISPs and websites have inserted § 230 as a
defense to libel claims, so they have asserted them as defenses to these
other claims.95 Defendants asserting § 230 under such circumstances have
succeeded in a remarkably high proportion of such cases.9
Returning to libel law, Batzel and Barrett have been followed by the
New York Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, and numerous district courts.97 In the past decade, not a
single court has rejected Barrett's holding that, in the context of a
defamation claim, § 230 shields a defendant from liability for posting a
defamatory statement wholly written by another person. To this extent -
at least in several prominent and populous jurisdictions - the
republication rule is no longer operative for defamatory statements posted
on the Internet.
The consequences of these rulings are remarkable. Anyone wishing
to hurt another person by damaging her or his reputation is free to do so
without accountability by finding a defamatory statement that someone
else has made and broadcasting it to the world over the Internet.98
Conversely, a person can anonymously plant seeds of defamation with
numerous website owners, knowing the website owners will be free to
broadcast these defamatory statements to the world. Those who are
solvent and have a large Internet audience can stay free of liability by
posting statements composed by others. Those who are insolvent and lack
a large Internet audience do not stand much to lose by posting defamatory
statements, and they can reach a large audience by feeding such
statements to Internet republishers. Where an anonymous defamer feeds
a libelous statement to a large website operator or member of a listserve,
9 See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, 961 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961-62 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2009) (explaining that
the plaintiff alleged the defendant was guilty of solicitations for sexual activity through
Craigslist.com); see also Miller v. Fed. Express Corp., 6 N.E.2d 1006,1006-07 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (providing the plaintiff alleged the defendant posted defamatory comments on the
Internet about him).
9 See, e.g., Dart, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (discussing that the defendant was immune from
liability pursuant to § 230(c)); see also Miller, 6 N.E.2d at 1013 (expressing that the defendant
claimed he was immune from liability based on the grounds of § 230).
% See, e.g., Zeran v. An Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding § 230 bars
the plaintiffs claim of defamation against the defendant); see also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct May 24, 1995)
(entering judgment for the defendant in a defamation case).
9 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406-07 (6th Cir.
2014) (recognizing § 230 provides immunity from liability for defendants in defamation
cases); see also Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y. Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 288-89 (N.Y. 2011)
(stating the Court followed the Barrett national consensus).
9 See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 467 (Del. 2005) (discussing a situation in which a
post on a website by an anonymous user was found not to be defamatory).
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there is simply no accountability and massive reputational harm. 99 We
are, as Judge Gould stated in his partial concurrence and partial dissent in
Batzel, inviting an Internet "Old West."1oo
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC is representative of
how Internet defamation law is now understood by a range of legal
actors.10 1 The principal defendant in that case was Nik Richie, the owner
and operator of the website thedirty.com.10 2 Members of the public are
invited and encouraged to send him nasty and pornographic statements
and pictures about whomever they wish to discuss.10 3 Richie selects
among them and then posts some prominently on his website, typically
adding some kind of commentary.1 04 The website, like many others of this
nature, has been very popular.105 The plaintiff was a major league football
cheerleader who sued Richie and the LLC owning his website because of
statements that she had a venereal disease and that she had slept with
every single member of the Cincinnati Bengals.106 The District Court
rejected Richie's argument that he was protected by the CDA, but the
court did not consider relying upon an active/passive distinction to do so;
rather, the argument was that Richie's solicitation of materials and his
9 See id. (concluding that the majority rules allow professional rumormongers and gossip-
hounds to spread false and hurtful information with impunity).
'n See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., dissenting) ("Congress
wanted to ensure that excessive government regulation did not slow America's expansion
into the exciting new frontier of the Internet. But Congress did not want this new frontier to
be like the Old West a lawless zone governed by retribution and mob justice."). In his
dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc (in which Judges Richard Tallian and Consuela
Maria Callahan concurred), Judge Ronald Gould wrote:
I do not believe that Congress intended to make, or ever would
consciously make, the policy choice made by the panel majority.
Human reputations, built on good conduct over decades, should be not
so easily tarnished and lost in a second of global Internet defamation.
Under the panel majority's rule, there might be a remedy against the
initial sender, but there is no remedy against the person who willingly
chooses, with no exercise of care, to amplify a malicious defamation by
lodging it on the Internet for all persons and for all time. Unless this
result was commanded by Congress, we should not create such a
system
Batzel v. Smith, 351 F.3d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004) (dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
1n See Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d at 407,417.
102 See id. at 401 (introducing the defendant, Nik Richie, in the case).
103 See id. (explaining how www.thedirty.com works).
104 See id. (indicating the steps that Richie took to operate the website).
105 See id. at 402 (expressing www.thedirty.com became nationally known).
1 See id. at 403 (stating Sarah Jones had been spotted around town with several of the
Cincinnati Bengals football players and that her boyfriend cheated on her with multiple
women, resulting in her having chlamydia and gonorrhea).
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commenting on them disqualified him from serving as a neutral
republisher of the contributor's defamatory posting.1ov
Following the great majority of courts, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the
question was whether Richie's additions were themselves defamatory in
an independent way; after answering this in the negative, the court ruled
that Richie's CDA defense warranted summary judgment for the
defendant.10o A tacit premise of the Sixth Circuit's entire analysis was that
under the CDA, Richie could not be held liable for the simple reposting of
his contributors' defamatory statements.1 09 In other words, the rejection
of the republication rule was simply taken for granted. Jones's treatment
by thedirty.com is but one example of a massive online industry that is
profoundly misogynistic and invasive of women's ordinary lives.n0
Notwithstanding my very dark picture of the current state of affairs,
it is of course possible that Batzel and Barrett were rightly decided, in at
least one important sense: it is possible that theirs is the more faithful
reading of the CDA. Many commentators seem to think so, and have
therefore called for revision of § 230.111
My own view is that, regardless of whether § 230 was a good idea in
the first place, Batzel and Barrett are wholly untenable as interpretations of
it. Indeed, my principal forward-looking claim in this Article is that future
courts interpreting § 230 should reject the Batzel-Barrett line of cases and
embrace the active/passive distinction in CDA interpretation. That is the
burden of Part IV, below. 112 But first, it is worth looking in a more
sustained manner at the problems that § 230 aimed to address -how
defamation law should apply to the Internet.
Ill. A DOCTRINALIST's ANALYSIS
A. The Publication Element and the Challenge of the Internet
In enacting § 230(c), Congress was addressing a difficult problem for
ISPs, bulletin-board operators, and related entities and individuals. They
107 See Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.2d at 405 (denying Dirty World's motion
for summary judgment and finding Dirty World was not immune from liability under § 230,
but clarifying that Dirty World was a neutral publisher of the defamatory post).
1os See id. at 417 (disagreeing with the district court and granting summary judgment for
Dirty World, finding immunity under § 230).
109 See id. at 415-16.
no0 See generally DANIELLE Cr[RoN, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (illustrating the
impact of cyber harassment on women throughout the United States and arguing for an
amendment to the CDA).
ill See, e.g., Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230
Immunity, 30 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1505,1555-57 (2015) (acknowledging the pitfalls of § 230 and
advocating revisions).
112 See infra Part IV (analyzing the court's view of the active/passive distinction in Batzel).
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faced the possibility of speech-based tort liability for postings that
somehow appeared through the ISP, but were not, in any traditional sense,
speech by the ISP. Commentators began discussing this possibility long
before Cubby was decided, and had escalated the discussion after Cubby.113
Stratton Oakmont proved it was not just hypothetical, and the fledgling
industry went ballistic. 114 The problem is that one can control whether
one makes a defamatory or tortious statement -whether one speaks or
writes, in the traditional sense -simply by refraining from making the
statement. By contrast, when someone else is doing the speaking or
writing, one has far less control. One may be able to remove the statement,
or conceivably filter it, but otherwise shutting down the mechanism
through which it appears is the most effective method. Both the potential
liability and the free speech impact of protecting against liability for what
others have said through one's Internet service are dramatically different
from that which attaches to what one has said. Section 230(c) was enacted
to protect these entities by ruling out federal liability and expressly
preempting all state law from imposing liability under such scenarios.115
If we wish to understand the statutory solution fully, however, we will
need to know more about both the publication element of defamation law
generally and the Stratton Oakmont ruling in particular. 116 That is what
this section provides.117
Legal commentators and the Stratton Oakmont court did not simply
pull legal arguments and categories out of a hat. Roughly a century of
(admittedly sparse) case law from common law jurisdictions had created
113 See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Prodigy Case May Solve Troubling Liability Puzzle, NAT'LL.J.,
B (1994) (commenting on legal theories discussed after Cubby); Edward V. DiLello,
Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards, 26
COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 199,210-11 (1993) (discussing the possibility of speech-based tort
liability after the Cubby decision); Philip H. Miller, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining
the First Amendment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1147,1148-
49 (1993) (addressing how the different characteristics of media affect the standards of free
speech that are applied and discussing the Cubby decision); Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the
Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin
Board Functions, 16 HASHNGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 87, 89 (1993) (acknowledging not all
communication through bulletin boards is the same); Robert Charles, Computer Bulletin
Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be Liable? Under What Standard?, 2J.L. & TECH. 121, 123-
24 (1987) (explaining the communication between the Internet mediums and the current libel
law).
114 See Clarke, supra note 39 (describing industry reaction to Stratton Oakmont).
115 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)-(2) (2012) (providing the purpose and meaning of § 230 in
detail).
116 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at
*3,6 (N.Y. Sup. CL May 24,1995) (describing the publication element of defamation and that
the court found Prodigy was a publisher due to the characteristics of the "Money Talk"
computer bulletin board).
117 See infra Part nII (discussing the publication element of defamation law).
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a number of cross-cutting distinctions and categories that illuminated the
background for the early 1990s discussion. Some of these were contained
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the work of treatise writers in
torts in general.118 However, neither courts nor commentators actually
saw through the sensitive application of doctrinal categories to the
Internet properly during that period, and Stratton Oakmont and the
upheaval that followed it were in part a consequence of confusion and
hazy legal thinking. In this context, § 230 will become much clearer, as
will the errors of Batzel and Barrett.119
The common law torts of libel and slander, like the tort of trespass to
land, are intentional torts. The intentionality of intentional torts has little
to do with the mens rea filled intentionality of criminal law. The law does
not require that the defendant have undertaken to bring about an injury
of a certain kind, but that the defendant have voluntarily and intentionally
performed a certain affirmative act. In the case of the defamation torts, it
is the uttering, inscribing, displaying, announcing, or posting of certain
defamatory statements about someone to a third party.
It is crucial to recognize that the common law of libel has never
equated the requirement of an affirmative act of publication to a third
party with the authorship of an assertion. This is true in both directions -
authorship is neither necessary nor sufficient for publication.1 20 An author
of a defamatory statement who places it in a letter to the plaintiff herself
has not published the libel, because she has not published it to a third
party.121 Conversely, a newspaper that publishes a column or an
advertisement written by another is a prototype of a publisher, regardless
of whether the author of the column or the advertisement is an agent of
the newspaper.1 22 Indeed, America's most famous libel case - New York
Times v. Sullivan -concerns a paid advertisement published by the New
York Times.123 Notwithstanding nine Supreme Court Justices who
118 See, e.g., WILUAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAw OF TORIS 797-802 (5th ed.
1984) (explaining the doctrinal categories of liability in defamation law).
119 See § 230 (describing the elements of the protection for private blocking and screening
of offensive material); see also Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 510-11 (Cal. 2006) (holding
that the messages posted to a newsgroup on the Internet were defamatory); see also Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling the operator was not able to take
advantage of § 230 immunity from liability).
120 See, e.g., Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, 312 (1922) (noting that in libel, unlike
slander, an act of inscription and an act of publication to a third party may be separate).
121 See, e.g., Yousling v. Dare, 98 N.W. 371, 371 (Iowa 1904) (holding that there is no libel
claim where a written statement was sent only to the person defamed, not to a third person).
122 See id (discussing that a person who has sent a defamatory statement to another is
considered a publisher and is guilty of defamation).
123 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 255 (1964) (explaining the respondent's
claim that a full page ad had been run in the New York Times, resulting in him being libeled).
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searched high and low for good arguments to shield the newspaper, not
one of the Justices questioned whether the New York Times counted as a
publisher of the advertisement, which was not written by an agent of the
New York Times.124
The basic point is this: an author's composition and utterance or
inscription of a statement is one thing; the act of presenting that statement
to a third party is another. Often the author performs both acts; indeed,
in slander, a single utterance to a third party is typically both. But in most
of what is litigated in the law of libel, the initial inscription and the
presentation to the world are separate acts.125 Libel suits against what, in
non-legalese, are called "publishers" -newspapers, book publishers, and
magazine publishers -are of course very common, even though these
have typically performed the second kind of affirmative act-presenting
something composed by another to the world - but not the first
(composing the statement).126
Unsurprisingly, over the centuries there has been some amount of
interpretation and innovation in the history of defamation law
surrounding some aspects of the rule requiring such an affirmative act of
publication. The challenges, which are remarkably few and far-between
in American case law, mainly come from two different sides. One side
involves crafting inclusive notions of agency and joint liability. Assuming
that a newspaper that printed a defamatory letter to the editor performed
the affirmative act of libeling, what about the company that made the
printing press or the newsvendor that sold the newspaper? What about
the telecommunications company that allowed one person to defame
another over the telephone? What about the bookstore or the newsvendor
that makes the publications available to buyers by selling them? These are
all questions about whether the making of the statement was in some
sense an act of those who play a causal role in having the statement made
public to third parties.
A different, and in some ways more profound, challenge to the
affirmative act requirement does not aim to depict the defendant as part
of the initial making or publishing of a statement, but aims to hold the
defendant responsible for failing to remove a statement that someone else
124 See id. (providing the complete analysis taken by the court to reach a decision).
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INSr. 1977) (listing a statement
and publication as separate elements of defamation).
126 See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 588 (2001) (listing what are
considered primary publishers and explaining that they are not the original authors).
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published. 127 This is quite a narrow exception to the rule that there must
be an affirmative act of publishing a statement; before the Internet, most
American lawyers had likely never even heard of a single libel case of this
nature. As in nonfeasance doctrine within the law of negligence, it applies
when a defendant is situated relative to the defamatory statement in such
a way that there are special reasons for thinking there is a duty to remove
it. Typically, the reason rests in significant part on the fact that the
defamatory statement appears on, in, or at a physical space over which the
defendant has possession and control, meaning that others do not have a
right or power to remove it.128 Overwhelmingly, courts require that the
defendant space-owner knew that the defamatory statement was there.129
Even with these two conditions satisfied, it is not clear that liability should
or will lie.13s
I shall call these two different forms of liability expanded-agency-based
misfeasance and affirmative duty to remove. Although American case law
contains only traces of these ideas, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (like
the Restatement (First)) actually contains a provision for each. Section 581
is written in a manner that appears limited, but in fact it contains quite a
broad reach, allowing for notice to trigger liability. 131
§ 581 Transmission of Defamation Published by Third
Person
(1) Except as stated in subsection (2), one who only
delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a
third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows
or has reason to know of its defamatory character.
(2) One who broadcasts defamatory matter by means of
radio or television is subject to the same liability as an
original publisher.132
127 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (stating
there is a duty to remove defamation when the owner of the property has knowledge of the
defamation).
128 See Annemarie Pantazis, Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.: Insulating Internet Serice Providers
from Defamation Liability, 34 WAxE FOREST L. REV. 531, 547-48 (1999) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW INsT. 1977) and explaining the court used § 577 to
support its notion).
129 See Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 759 (1952) (emphasizing the defendant's awareness
of the existence of defamatory matter).
130 See Scott v. Hull, 259 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1970) (holding the defendant was not liable for
failing to remove defamatory graffiti because he did not invite the public to view it and did
not perform a positive act).
131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORIS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (permitting liability for
a distributor who has notice).
132 Id.
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Section 581(1) is typically cited as the source for distributor liability in the
Restatement (Second).133
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 577(2), by contrast, concerns
liability for those who -while not actually publishing -will be subjected
to liability for the reputational injury that is attributable to the defendant's
failure to remove a defamatory statement published by another person.1as
It states "[olne who intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove
defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels in his
possession or under his control is subject to liability for its continued
publication."135
Initially, it is worth noting that neither of these routes captures a
distinctive form of transmission that arguably fits an ISP the best-the
common carrier. The rather sparse case law on common carriers quite
defensibly takes the view that common carriers are not publishers and are
not liable as if they were publishers.l3 And indeed, the New York Court of
Appeals, in a case that came to it after Stratton Oakmont had been decided
but before the CDA was in effect, plausibly ruled as a matter of common
law that there was no liability for AOL because it was a common carrier.137
Secondly, both the expanded-agency category and the affirmative-
duty-to-remove category are remarkably underdeveloped and
questionable in American law; the Restatement (Second) is highly
misleading, in this respect, as today's leading Torts treatise, Dobbs,
Hayden and Bublick's The Law of Torts now confirms.'" The case law cited
in the Restatement (Second) provision concerning distributors is
overwhelmingly prior to the Restatement (First).1 3 9 Given that the New
133 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 118, at 810 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581 for distributor liability).
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW INSr. 1977) (stating a third
party can be liable for defamation if the defamatory statement is not removed).
135 Id.
136 See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that the
telephone company was not liable for defamation because it was a common carrier).
137 See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Corp., 723 N.E.2d 539, 543 (N.Y. 1999) (applying the
common carrier category to the Internet and holding the publication element of libel was not
satisfied).
1 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 522 n.5 (2nd ed. 2011) (answering the
question of whether a neutral distributor, such as a library, is liable even if the distributor
knows of the defamation by suggesting that the English cases, which is the precedent for
such liability, are "doubtful authority for American consumption" in light of
"[clontemporary American ideas about liability for speech").
139 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (discussing the
outdated cases in the Restatement). Of the twelve cases cited in the Reporters' Notes on
distributors, the majority were over one hundred years old. Reporters' Notes to § 581,
comments a-c. Only six were American, and of these six, only two were decided after New
York Times v. Sullivan. Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla.App.), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 674
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York Times v. Sullivan revolution occurred between the two Restatements,
it is likely that such section 581-based libel suits against libraries would
not survive a First Amendment attack, for the chilling effect argument
would seem to be very powerful as applied to defamation law that
requires distributors to engage in censorship.140 It is more than a bit
peculiar that scores of judges and law review authors since Cubby have
contrasted publisher liability with distributor liability, given that Zeran's
statements about distributor liability were almost entirely adventitious
and without support in the applicable American law.141
The few section 577(2) cases that exist are questionable and peculiar.
Hellar v. Bianco is the best known case. In 1952, an intermediate California
court announced that it might be willing to hold a tavern owner liable to
a plaintiff and her husband because its bartender did not immediately
(Fla. 1977); Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn Med. Ass'n Fed'n, 264 N.W2d 152
(Minn. 1978). Cardozo v. True is not a defamation case at all, but rather a personal injury
products liability case against a book dealer, which failed as a matter of law. Cardozo, 342
So. 2d at 1056. It provides no support whatsoever for the statement that book dealers are
liable with knowledge in a libel claim, in dicta it states that they are surely not libel without
knowledge, which is a different point Id. Church of Scientology is a libel claim; it holds only
that lack of knowledge precludes a libel claim against a distributor, not that knowledge
inculpates a distributor. Church of Scientology of Minn., 246 N.W.2d at 154-55
Among the scholars asserting that it was established law in the United States, prior to
§ 230, that distributors face liability for libel if they have knowledge, few rely upon anything
but Restatement (Second) § 581, criticized above. In a forceful and unusually well-researched
article written in 2001, Professor Susan Freiwald did cite two post-New York Times v. Sullivan
cases to support distributor liability under section 581. Freiwald, supra note 126, at 590 n.81;
see also Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266,1272 (D. Wyo. 1986); Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co.,
745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984). In the end, however, these cases only underline the
remarkable dearth of support for knowledge-based distributor liability today. Lerman is not
a libel case, but a misappropriation case, and, in any event, the distributor prevailed. Spence
is a libel case in a federal district court that is interpreting Wyoming tort law on a motion to
remand. The question there was whether the defendant non-resident magazine publisher
seeking to remove a libel case from state court to federal court should succeed on a motion
to remand. Flynt's argument was that the Wyoming distributor was fraudulently joined in
state court to defeat removal. The District Court said Hustler could succeed only through
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that there was no way the plaintiff could
possibly win against the distributor of the pornographic magazine. With no apparent
consideration of the First Amendment and no relevant precedent (other than section 581),
the District Court declined to classify the cause of action against the distributor as fraudulent
and remanded the case. Id.
140 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (outlining that "chilling effect" of strict
liability or fault standard warrants "actual malice" rule); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
Toms § 581 (AM. LAw INST. 1977) (stating third-party liability for transmission of
defamation).
141 See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(discussing the difference between publisher and distributor liability); see also Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating notice of a defamatory posting causes
computer service providers to become traditional publishers).
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erase some nasty graffiti about her from the men's room bathroom stall.142
Regardless of whether one agrees with Judge Frank Easterbrook's wry
comment in Tacket v. General Motors Corp. (also imposing liability for
failure to remove) that "the common law of washrooms is otherwise," the
law of libel by failure-to-remove is extremely underdeveloped.1xa Indeed,
even in the United Kingdom, where Internet service providers have
indeed faced failure-to-remove liability, plaintiffs had to rely entirely
upon Byrne v. Deane, an almost cartoonish Court of Appeal case in which
the permissibility of failure-to-remove liability is pure dicta.144
Notwithstanding the concerns raised above (or perhaps oblivious to
them), thoughtful commentators (often law students writing Notes) in the
early 1990s saw the possibility of holding ISPs liable for the postings of
others under three-plus views. They are: (1) a full-fledged newspaper-
142 See Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 758 (CaL 1952) (providing the facts of the case and
imposing liability for not removing defamation).
14 See 836 F.2d 1042,1047 (7th Cir. 1987).
14 See Tamiz v. Google, Inc., EWCA Civ. 68, 1 W.L.R 2151 (2013) (rejecting liability based
on the facts of the case, but recognizing, in principle, the possibility of liability for failure to
remove, after notice, but not within publisher or distributor framework). Many of the
common law categories and analyses (of libel on the Internet) that are discussed in this
Article have been dealt with explicitly in other common law jurisdictions, which lack or did
lack any statutory shield for ISPs. See generally Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful
Speecl Lessons from Abroad, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289 (2014) (describing treatment of ISPs
and website hosts in non-American common law jurisdictions); see also Byrne v. Deane, 1
KB. 818 (1937). Members of a private club at a golf course in rural England enjoyed the
illegal gaming machines kept in their clubhouse. Byrne, 1 KB. at 818. They were therefore
distressed when the clubhouse was raided by public authorities and the tables were
removed. Id. At the spot in the clubhouse room where the gaming tables had been, a verse
was posted on the wall:
For many years upon this spot
You heard the sound of a merry bell
Those who were rash and those who were not
Lost and made a spot of cash
But he who gave the game away
May he byrnn in hell and rue the day.
"Diddleramus"
Id. The word "byrnn" in the last line was crossed out, and the word "burn" was scrawled
over it. Id. A member of the club, Mr. Byrne, brought a libel claim against the proprietors of
the clubhouse, arguing that this verse essentially communicated that it was Mr. Byrne who
had secretly reported to the police on the existence of illegal gambling. Id. Byrne denied this
and claimed that his reputation had suffered. Id. The clubhouse owners argued that a libel
claim includes a publication element, which they did not satisfy since they neither wrote nor
posted the anonymous verse. Byrne, 1 KB. at 818. While the trial court accepted this
argument, each of the three judges on the Court of Appeal panel that heard the case opined
that the publication element could be met in this case. Id. Under the circumstances, the
knowing failure to remove the verse from their own property could count as publication. Id.
The decision as to the publication element was only dicta, because the Court of Appeal also
ruled that it was not defamatory to say of someone that he reported a crime to the police. Id.
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publisher theory; (2) an expanded agency theory, treating ISPs as
distributors and imposing liability under section 581; and (3-plus) an
affirmative-duty-to-remove route, as in section 577(2) (which may depend
on ownership or property or chattels, as in section 577(2) itself, or on an
undertaking-to-protect theory). In each case, there was allegedly a
doctrinal path under state defamation law for saying that the publication
element of a libel clam was satisfied, and, in this sense, there was a
doctrinal path for treating an ISP as a publisher of a statement that the ISP
itself did not post.
B. Stratton Oakmont Revisited
Stratton Oakmont's lawyers drew upon this fledgling Internet-
liability scholarship in crafting their complaint and in writing their briefs
to Justice Ain.145 Recall, however, that Judge Leisure had selected the
distributor category only two years earlier in Cubby, and, on that basis,
had granted the defendant summary judgment.14 6 Understandably, then,
Stratton Oakmont was driven to argue that theirs was not a distributor
case; indeed, of the three routes above - publisher, expanded-agency
based distributor liability, and affirmative-duty-to-remove- the middle
category is the only one Stratton Oakmont did not argue.147 Its complaint
and its brief were committed to the first and third categories.
A bit more detail about Prodigy's history will be illuminating. From
its inception, Prodigy played to the family-values mantra that had taken a
major foothold in the Reagan 1980s and the first Bush Presidency. The
company boasted of its commitment to filtering and censoring materials
with a "family-oriented" mindset.148 It hired individuals to monitor its
145 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
at 11 n.3, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. CL May 24,1995) (No. 94-031063) (on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review)
(citing Robert Charles, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be Liable? Under
What Standard?, 2 J.L & TEcH. 121, 122 (1987)); id. at 12 n.4 (citing Philip H. Miller, New
Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amendment Status of Electronic Information
Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 1147 (1993)); id. at 13 n.5 (citing Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the
Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin
Board Functions, 16 HASrHNGs CoMm. & ENT. LJ. 87, 89 (1993)); id. at 13 n.6 (citing Edward V.
DiLello, Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of Speech on Computer Bulletin
Boards, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 199,210-11 (1993)).
14 See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 141.
147 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (arguing Prodigy is not a distributor).
14 See Defendant Prodigy Services Company's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9-18, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct May 24, 1995) (No. 94-031063) (on
file with the Valparaiso Law Review) (recounting history of Prodigy and changes in Prodigy
filtering).
2016] Online Defamation 25
bulletin boards and remove obscene or otherwise offensive materials. In
the early 1990s, it made an effort to review - or to have its hired monitors
review -everything that users posted. It also used software with
algorithms for discovering obscene or offensive materials and filtering
them out. This was a marketing ploy and a company goal. During this
period, Prodigy's marketing director went so far as to analogize Prodigy
explicitly to a "newspaper" publisher.149
Within a few years of functioning in this manner, however, the growth
of the Internet and the growth of Prodigy itself made clear that its
aspirations for total monitoring were wildly unrealistic. For one thing,
algorithms were not up to the task of discovering obscene, pornographic,
or inappropriate materials. And for another, the rate and number of
postings, starting to be in the tens of thousands daily, were far beyond
what could be checked thoroughly -either in advance, or even in an
ongoing way. Nonetheless, Prodigy's marketing materials, strategy, and
structure from its earlier years remained public, and it had not yet fully
recognized how it would have to change.
Stratton Oakmont's litigation strategy, as displayed in its complaint
and its briefs, prudently took advantage of Prodigy's marketed self-image.
The most obvious line of argument, and the one Stratton Oakmont placed
front and center, was simply that Prodigy was virtually the same as a
newspaper publisher. After all, Prodigy had said this expressly about
itself:
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that
reflects the culture of the millions of American families
we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible newspaper
does less when it chooses the type of advertising it
publishes, the letters it prints, the degree of nudity and
unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.1so
Prodigy's admission is undoubtedly part of what gave Justice Ain
comfort in his unusual grant of partial summary judgment to the
plaintiff.1 5 The lawyers for Prodigy pointed out that the admission was
149 See id.
IS See id. at *2 (quoting Exhibit J to Plaintiffs' Affidavit).
151 The court was remarkably unclear on why it was granting plaintiff partial summary
judgment on publication, rather than treating publication as a fact issue and giving the
publication issue to the jury to decide-which would itself have been a remarkably pro-
plaintiff decision Id. at *1. The court stated the following:
Again, [Prodigy] insists that its former policy of manually reviewing all
messages prior to posting was changed "long before the messages
complained of by Plaintiffs were posted." (Schneck affidavit, par. 4.)
However, no documentation or detailed explanation of such a change,
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stale and that the Internet business was changing dramatically in the early
1990s. However, Stratton Oakmont had anticipated such arguments and
was prepared with several additional points, which relied upon the
budding legal scholarship on libel law and how it would apply to the
Internet. One of its key arguments- again based on Prodigy admissions,
but current ones -was that Prodigy actively engaged in censorship and
filtering of online communications of others. 152 In this way, Prodigy
exercised control of what appeared through it, and, in this respect, was
much more like a traditional newspaper publisher than Compuserve.
Indeed, Prodigy tried to gain market advantage over competitors like
Compuserve by engaging in such editorial functions. Stratton Oakmont
rightly argued that Prodigy's exercise of editorial functions was a factor
that counted in favor of treating it like a newspaper publisher. All of this
was channeled into an argument that Justice Ain should grant partial
summary judgment on the issue of whether Prodigy was a publisher.1ss
Crucially, however, Stratton Oakmont had a quite different argument,
too; indeed, Stratton Oakmont's partial summary judgment motion was
divided into two parts, and its second argument occupied the second part
of its brief.lM Stratton Oakmont pointed out that Prodigy had hired an
individual, Charles Epstein, to serve as what it called a "Board Leader"
for its bulletin board, "Money Talk." As Board Leader, Epstein's job was
and the dissemination of news of such a change, has been submitted. In
addition, [Prodigy] argues that in terms of sheer volume-currently
60,000 messages a day are posted on [Prodigy] bulletin boards-manual
review of messages is not feasible. While [Prodigy] admits that Board
Leaders may remove messages that violate its Guidelines, it claims in
conclusory manner that Board Leaders do not function as "editors".
Furthermore, [Prodigy] argues generally that this Court should not
decide issues that can directly impact this developing communications
medium without the benefit of a full record, although it fails to describe
what further facts remain to be developed on this issue of whether it is a
publisher.
Id. at *3 (emphasis added). The italicized sentence is hard to comprehend, given that the
court had just described the need for documentation and more information on "feasibility."
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3. Relatedly, it is bizarre that the court stated that
"the critical issue to be determined by this Court is whether the foregoing evidence
establishes a prima facie case that [Prodigy] exercised sufficient editorial control over its
computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same responsibilities as a
newspaper." Id. (emphasis added). A prima facie case is what a plaintiff needs to withstand
a defendant's summary judgment motion, not what a plaintiff needs to prevail on (partial)
summary judgment Id.
152 See id. at *2.
153 See id. at *1.
1' See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
14-19, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. CL May 24,1995) (No. 94-031063) (arguing that Epstein served as Prodigy's agent
by editing "Money Talk").
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to monitor the electronic bulletin board on which the defamatory
statements were posted and to remove some when appropriate.15 5
Stratton Oakmont alleged that Epstein had failed to remove these
postings, even though such postings violated policies of not publishing
offensive material.15 6 Prodigy responded that Epstein was an
independent contractor, rather than an employee; therefore, Prodigy
could not be held vicariously liable for Epstein's failures. 57 To this,
Stratton Oakmont argued that, independent contractor or not, basic
principles of agency law required that Stratton Oakmont be deemed
potentially liable for Epstein's failures in monitoring the Prodigy bulletin
board and that partial summary judgment was also warranted on this
agency issue.15 s
As mentioned above, when we step back from Stratton Oakmont and
see it within the framework of libel law's doctrinal categories - true
publisher, extended agency (distributor, etc.), and affirmative duty to
remove -it is clear that the plaintiff was interested in two parts: the true
publisher part (involving Stratton Oakmont's admissions) and the
affirmative-duty-to-remove part (involving Epstein's alleged failures).159
The distributor theory was left out-not only because there was nothing
about Prodigy that made it seem like a distributor in this context, but also,
and more importantly, because the distributor argument had worked on
summary judgment for Compuserve and Stratton Oakmonfs aim was to
distinguish Prodigy from Compuserve.o60
Justice Ain's grant of plaintiff's partial summary judgment motion
actually addressed both of Stratton Oakmont's arguments.161 And it
awarded partially summary judgment on both: on the true publisher
argument and on the affirmative-duty-to-remove part (pertaining to the
agency relationship).1 62 "Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that
Epstein acted as [Prodigy's] agent for the purposes of the acts and
omissions alleged in the complaint."163
1ss See Second Amended Verified Complaint at 5, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs.
Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (No. 94-031063)
(alleging Prodigy breached duty of care).
'5 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
157 See id. at *5.
158 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 14, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710,
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,1995) (No. 94-031063) (asserting Epstein was Prodigy's agent).
1s9 See id. at 2.
160 See id. at 9-10 (contrasting the facts in this case from those in CompuSeme).
161 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *1, *5 (stating Epstein's capacity as a
publisher and the duty to censor).
162 See id.
163 Id. at *7.
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To be sure, the relevance of Justice Ain's "agency" ruling was not
rendered pellucid in the decision itself.lM One can read the opinion and
believe there is simply one legal theory in the case -that Prodigy's role is
that of a newspaper publisher.165 Note, however, that if that were true,
whether Epstein was an agent would be irrelevant to Prodigy's liability.166
Since the posting was plainly on a Prodigy bulletin board and there was
no allegation that Epstein put it there, a finding that Prodigy was the
publisher of what was posted in its bulletin board would suffice for
publisher-liability. It would be irrelevant whether Epstein was at fault for
failure to remove it. Part of the point of treating an entity as a true
publisher is that there is essentially strict liability for the publishing of it
In that event, Epstein's acts and omissions would be irrelevant. Epstein's
conduct was relevant to Stratton Oakmont's claim because Stratton
Oakmont contended that Board Leaders, like Epstein, had a duty to
remove defamatory statements, and Epstein breached that duty by
negligently omitting to remove the statement.167
The second issue of Stratton Oakmont related not to the
newspaper/ distributor connection as such, but rather to the question of
whether liability could be imposed for the negligent failure to comply
with a duty to remove defamatory statements. This was a sensible and
difficult debate presented by the facts of Stratton Oakmont, but it was not
really about whether Prodigy was like a newspaper publisher in the sense
of actively placing statements by others out into the world for third
parties. However, this does not necessarily end the important debate; it
leads to another one: whether Prodigy could be held responsible for the
reputational harm suffered by virtue of its (or its agents) having breached
an affirmative duty to filter or delete others' postings. For one thing, its
bulletin boards were closely analogous to the bulletin boards, chattels, or
property that are referred to in section 577(2).168 And for another, it
arguably undertook to screen and delete.
Once this affirmative duty framework is seen, Prodigy's repeated
assertions that it was capable of filtering, selecting, editing, and deleting
' See id.
16 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The Stratton Oakmont court reasoned that Prodigy's decision to
perform some voluntary self-policing made it akin to a newspaper publisher . . . .").
166 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *6 (discussing Epstein's agency
relationship).
167 See Second Amended Verified Complaint at 5, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs.
Co., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,1995).
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) ("One who
intentionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be
exhibited on land or chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for
its continued publication.").
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take on a whole different light.169 Prodigy had undertaken to remove, then
failed to live up to its undertaking.170 Moreover, it had created in readers
an expectation of removal, and therefore, added to the perception of
endorsement.' 7 ' Finally, it had undercut the credibility of protestations of
lack of control.172 In this context, the argument for an affirmative duty to
remove was powerful.173 Relatedly, the argument that the injury was
suffered due to the failure to remove or filter out was also quite strong.174
This was one of Stratton Oakmont's principal arguments.17s While
Stratton Oakmont's first argument was that Prodigy was simply like a
newspaper publisher, the larger picture put forward by Stratton Oakmont
was that Prodigy had an affirmative duty to remove defamatory postings
because of its undertaking.1 76 Indeed, Stratton Oakmont's reply brief uses
language emphasizing the undertaking basis of the affirmative duty:
"having undertaken a duty to edit, Prodigy cannot now complain that its
[sic] too difficult for it to do so properly," " [t]he law is settled in New York
that one who assumes a duty to act, even though gratuitously, may
thereby become subject to the 'duty of acting carefuly.'""77 And these
undertaking-based arguments by Stratton Oakmont were, ultimately, key
to the basis of Justice Ain's ruling: " [Prodigy's] conscious choice, to gain
the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than
CompuServe and other computer networks that make no such choice." 178
' See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (contending Prodigy knew about the
Board Leaders' ability to remove messages in violation of the guidelines).
170 See id. at *5 (stating Prodigy had in fact benefitted by undertaking editorial control).
'71 See id. at *5 (arguing that undertaking editorial duties gave Prodigy a family-friendly
image).
172 See id. at *4 (distinguishing the case from Compuserve in part because Prodigy had
control over the content of its bulletin boards).
173 See Second Amended Verified Complaint at 14-15, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (alleging
Prodigy intentionally marketed the fact that the bulletin boards were controlled by editors,
leading to the breached duty of care).
174 See id. at 16 (contending Prodigy knowingly refused to take the libelous content off the
bulletin board).
'73 See id. at 14-15 (arguing Prodigy undertook a duty by having editors filter content).
176 See id. at 15-16 (basing more argumentation on the duty to remove).
17 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at Z Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,1995
WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. CL May 24, 1994); id. at 12 (citing Florence v. Goldberg, 375
N.E.2d 763, 766 (N.Y. 1978) and quoting Florence's quotation of Chief Judge Benjamin
Cardozo's statement, in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 8%, 898 (N.Y. 1928)
that "the hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with impunity though
liability would fail if it had never been applied at all").
'78 Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710 at *5.
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C. CDA § 230 and the Good Samaritan
On this interpretation of Stratton Oakmont, Congress's effort to
overrule the case with something called a "Good Samaritan" statute
makes perfect sense. More precisely, § 230(c) becomes clear when
interpreted as a statute aimed at preempting "failure-to-remove" based
arguments for ISP liability that were founded in an undertaking to censor
and delete. 179
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and
screening of offensive material ...
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of -
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable .... 180
This section basically reverses Justice Ain's statement that an ISP's choice
to restrict, filter, remove, delete, and edit creates an affirmative duty to do
so and liability concomitant on that affirmative duty; it states that an ISP's
choice to filter or delete material posted by others shall not be a basis for
holding an ISP civilly liable for negligent failing to do so.xsn But this of
course forces us to ask the question: why would it be a basis for holding
them liable, and this quite naturally leads us to ask why was it a basis for
holding Prodigy liable?
The answer is now clear: in the context of an effort to hold a defendant
liable for failure to filter out or remove a defamatory statement from a
place over which the defendant has special control, a practice of restriction
and censorship can be a basis for holding them liable for failure to filter or
remove.182 Section 230(c) proclaims that courts may not make this
17 See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996) ("One of the specific purposes of this section is
to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated []
providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they
have restricted access to objectionable material").
180 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012).
181 See § 230(c)(2)(A) (negating potential publisher liability for Internet providers).
182 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) ("under [Stratton
Oakmont's] holding, computer service providers who regulated the dissemination of
offensive material on their services risked subjecting themselves to liability, because such
regulation cast the service provider in the role of the publisher").
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inference from a practice-of-removal-and-restriction to liability for failure
to filter or remove.183
We are, of course, familiar with exactly the same pattern of argument
in the law of negligence.184 At the common law, strangers do not, in the
first instance, have duties to help those in need.1s5 If, however, a stranger
has undertaken to help someone, she may be held be liable for the injuries
resulting from her failure to help effectively.1s6 State legislatures across
the country have been alert to a pathological set of incentives in this
common law structure: a person may be disincentivized from being a
Good Samaritan because such volunteering is treated by the common law
as a basis for inferring a duty of care where none existed before.187 In
response, every American state legislature has passed a Good Samaritan
statute to eliminate the common law disincentive: these statutes provide
a shield to defendants who do make efforts to rescue by ensuring that such
efforts will not be utilized as a basis for overturning the basic rule that
there is no affirmative duty to help.1as
On my account, it is no coincidence that the § 230(c) is actually
expressly named "Protection for Good Samaritan blocking and screening
of offensive materials."189 It is, in fact, a parallel to state Good Samaritan
statutes that protect those who voluntarily provide emergency aid.190 Its
aim is to shield (from tort liability) those who voluntarily protect
individuals from Internet speech that would harm them; removing such
speech or filtering will not generate civil liability; courts will not be
allowed to convert an ISP's affirmative undertaking into a basis for
liability.
The legislative history unambiguously confirms the importance of the
Good Samaritan idea that is explicit in the text.191 Representative Chris
18 See § 230(c)(2) (granting immunity for online publishers who voluntarily make a good
faith effort to patrol user posts).
184 See Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864 P.2d 839, 842-43 (Okla. 1993) (describing
duty-of-care-based counterincentives to voluntary aid at common law as a basis for Good
Samaritan statute).
185 See id.
186 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (illustrating that
undertaking to rescue, and doing so negligently, can trigger liability to a third party).
187 See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (West 2013) (shielding good faith
rescuers from tort liability).
188 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 312 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that every
American state has a Good Samaritan statute).
' See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012) (titling the section, "Protection for 'Good Samaritan'
blocking and screening of offensive material").
190 Compare id. (providing immunity for publishers who undertake to patrol the content on
their websites), with TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (providing immunity for
traditional rescuers in emergency situations).
191 See H.R REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
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Cox of California, who (along with Representative Ron Wyden of Oregon)
spearheaded § 230, testified to Congress as follows:
... Ironically, the existing legal system provides a
massive disincentive for the people who might best help
us control the Internet to do so.
I will give you two quick examples: A Federal court
in New York, in a case involving CompuServe, one of our
on-line service providers, held that CompuServe would
not be liable in a defamation case because it was not the
publisher or editor of the material. It just let everything
come onto your computer without, in any way, trying to
screen it or control it.
But another New York court, the New York Supreme
Court, held that Prodigy, CompuServe's competitor,
could be held liable in a $200 million defamation case
because someone had posted on one of their bulletin
boards, a financial bulletin board, some remarks that
apparently were untrue about an investment bank, that
the investment bank would go out of business and was
run by crooks.
Prodigy said, "No, no; just like CompuServe, we did
not control or edit that information, nor could we,
frankly. We have over 60,000 of these messages each day,
we have over 2 million subscribers, and so you cannot
proceed with this kind of a case against us."
The court said, "No, no, no, no, you are different; you
are different than CompuServe because you are a family-
friendly network. You advertise yourself as such. You
employ screening and blocking software that keeps
obscenity off of your network. You have people who are
hired to exercise an emergency delete function to keep
that kind of material away from your subscribers. You
don't permit nudity on your system. You have content
guidelines. You, therefore, are going to face higher,
stricker (sic) liability because you tried to exercise some
control over offensive material."
Mr. Chairman, that is backward. We want to
encourage people like Prodigy, like CompuServe, like
America Online, like the new Microsoft network, to do
everything possible for us, the customer, to help us
control, at the portals of our computer, at the front door
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of our house, what comes in and what our children
see....
. . . [O]ur amendment will ... protect computer Good
Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who
provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes
steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their
customers. It will protect them from taking on liability
such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New York that
they should not face for helping us and for helping us
solve this problem.192
As indicated, the express language of "Good Samaritan" endured all the
way into the text of the statute.193 Section 230 plainly constitutes an
Internet version of the traditional Good Samaritan statute.1 4  To
incentivize voluntarily protecting those who are at peril of injury, it
negates the common law principle that voluntarily protecting others
creates an affirmative duty where none existed before.
Attending to the affirmative-duty, or Good Samaritan, part of Stratton
Oakmont illuminates two other important features of the text of § 230(c).195
First, consider § 230(c)(2)(b)'s reference to "enabling":
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of ...
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).196
Plainly, the statute is no longer contemplating a defendant in a libel suit
who is acting like a newspaper publisher; it is contemplating an actor (ISP
or IS user) who has undertaken to provide others with means to restrict
obscene materials.197 Why would a jurisdiction ever impose liability for
such enabling conduct? It has nothing to do with supplying the medium
of publication or contributing to the action of publication; to the contrary,
19 141 CONG. REC. H8460-01 (1995).
193 See § 230(c)(2)(A).
19 See supra note 190 and accompanying text (comparing Texas's Good Samaritan statute
with § 230(c)).
195 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710, at *5
(N.Y. Sup. CL May 24,1995) (assessing Stratton Oakmont's liability as a publisher).
1% § 230(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
19 See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169,1174-75 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[S]ection
230(c)(2)(B) ... covers actions taken to enable or make available to others the technical means
to restrict access to objectionable material.").
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it is about undertaking to restrict material. The answer is that the statutory
framework contemplates affirmative duties to restrict successfully that are
acquired by virtue of having undertaken to restrict or to enable others to
restrict.198
Second, Stratton Oaknont's discussion of the "Board Leader" and the
putative consequences of his negligent failure to remove is critical in
illuminating the place of the word "user" in § 230.199
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of -
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable . .200
The idea is that not only the ISP directly (Prodigy) but also the individual
person engaged in deleting or restricting (Board Leader Epstein) cannot
be held liable for the defamatory content of what makes it through, simply
by virtue of having engaged in the undertaking. We are well outside of
the domain of contemplating liability for extended agency, for newspaper
publisher or distributor; what is contemplated is liability for failure to
remove, predicated upon something akin to a commenced rescue. That is
why the actor protected by the statute need not be an ISP, but could be
simply a user.
D. Zeran Revisited
It is illuminating to revisit Zeran with this background understanding
in place.201 Zeran was a tricky case and not simply because of its powerful
facts or because the plaintiff chose to make a "distributor" argument,
rather than a section 577(2), failure-to-remove argument.202 It was a tricky
case because it fell into what might be have been perceived as a textual
gap in § 230. The doctrinal, historical, and statutory analysis above
19 See § 230(c)(2)(B) (" [Any action taken to enable or make available....").
19 See James P. Jenal, When is a User not a "User"? Finding the Proper Role for Republication
Liability on the Internet, 24 LoY. OF L.A. ENT. L. REV. 453-54 (2004) (identifying who counts as
a "user" as an important CDA issue and arguing that the CDA's shield should not apply to
Rosenthal (in Barrett v. Rosenthal) because being a non-moderating poster should not count
as a "user").
" § 230(c)(2)(A).
201 See supra Part Il.A-C (discussing the differing approaches to how a plaintiff might try
to satisfy the publication element of a libel claim).
2 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,329-32 (4th Cir. 1997).
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indicated that - in retrospect - there were really three promising ways for
Stratton Oakmont to have argued that Prodigy should face liability. The
first was to depict an ISP, like Prodigy, as closely analogous to a
newspaper publisher, and as a publisher by virtue of its misfeasance-like
involvement in doing things that bring an original author's inscriptive
utterances to the eyes of a third party. Both Prodigy's evidentiary
admissions and its allegedly editorial activities stood as support for this
view.203 A second was to view Prodigy as a property owner with special
control over a surface and notice of the defamatory content on it; under
section 577(2), such persons arguably have affirmative duties to remove
defamatory statements made by others, and the failure to do so can subject
one to defamation liability - in effect, substituting failure to remove for
active publication, and thereby fulfilling the publication element.204 Third,
even assuming there is, in general, no duty rooted in section 577(2), for an
ISP to remove postings on its bulletin board, one could argue that
undertaking to censor, remove, and protect the reputational victims itself
generates an affirmative duty to do so. 205
Section 230(c)(1) is most plainly understood as a rejection of the
central Stratton Oakmont idea that ISPs are like newspaper publishers, as
Mr. Zeran contended. Section 230(c)(2), as I have argued and as the "Good
Samaritan" textual language makes amply clear, is at least in part about
the impermissibility of inferring affirmative duties to delete from
undertakings to censor and control.206 But an argument can be made that
2 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,1995 WL 323710, at *5
(N.Y. Sup. CL May 24,1995) (discussing Prodigy's admissions).
2 See supra Part III.A (referring to a property owner's affirmative duty to remove
defamatory content).
2 My post-230, backward-looking enumeration of promising arguments for Stratton
Oakmont here, is somewhat different from the enumeration offered in Part III.B, purporting
to occupy Stratton Oakmont's strategic perspective. There, I suggested there were "three-
plus" routes to argue for publication: (1) newspaper publisher; (2) distributor; and (3 plus)
affirmative duty, either as land/chattels owner or based on an undertaking to protect. I
suggested that the distributor argument was ruled out for Stratton Oakmont as strategically
unappealing, because of Cubby (and because the facts did not support a distributor-like role,
as they had in Cubby) and that Stratton Oakmont seems to have succeeded by a combination
of the newspaper argument and the affirmative duty/undertaking argument. In my post-
230 analysis, looking backwards at Stratton Oakmont, I arrive at the three "promising" routes
by omitting the "distributor" argument-leaving the newspaper and the affirmative
duty/undertaking argument, but breaking the latter into two. Thus, the three routes are: (1)
newspaper; (2) affirmative duty based on property/chattels ownership; and (3) affirmative
duty based on special undertaking to protect or filter.
2 For this reason, there is a powerful argument that Blumenthal v. Drudge was correctly
decided in favor of AOL. 992 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). The United States District Court for
the District of D.C. interpreted § 230(c)(1) to state that courts may not treat ISPs (like AOL,
the defendant) as if they were newspaper publishers. In Blumenthal, AOL was behaving
exactly like a newspaper publisher with respect to a syndicated columnist It had a monthly
36 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.51
Zeran was about neither of these categories; it was about the second,
special-control-over-chattels-based argument for an affirmative duty to
remove. That path to recovery at first appears not to have been addressed
by (c)(1) or by (c)(2). Because Mr. Zeran's lawyer chose to frame his
argument in terms of distributor-liability, rather than affirmative duty to
remove, and because scores of scholars have followed Zeran's parsing of
the issues, courts and commentators in the United States have not
addressed head-on the section 577(2) affirmative duty argument that does
not depend on an undertaking. 207 In other words, reading the two parts
of § 230(c) separately seems to lead to the conclusion AOL has no defense
against pre-Internet case law saying that there is a duty to remove, with
notice, because one is the owner of the chattels or the property.2
But, of course, there is no reason to read each of the two clauses
separately; there is reason to read them together, in context, as Justice
Antonin Scalia and a generation of textualist scholars have made clear.209
They are both part of the same law, passed at the same time, in response
to the same case, and dealing with a large and difficult question.210 As this
Article has argued at length, both the text and the history of (c)(2)
demonstrate that it says: a failing affirmative duty argument for removal
deal with the gossip columnist, Matthew Drudge, to carry his website-based gossip column
on AOL for AOL subscribers. The court in Blumenthal was arguably confronting an ISP that
took an active step to post the column Nonetheless, Stratton Oakmont's entire first half is so
plausibly understood as a ruling that ISPs should be treated as newspaper publishers, that it
is difficult to deny that § 230(c)(1) (expressly aimed at overruling Stratton Oakmont) is at least
partially an effort to preempt the newspaper publisher analogy.
20 But see Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001). The majority of the Florida
Supreme Court fended off a critique of Zeran on textualist grounds by reasoning that all of
Restatement (Second) § 577 pertained to the "publication" element, plausibly reasoning that
the Restatement understands failure to remove (under section 577(2)) as one way of
satisfying the publication element In this response -and especially in light of the dissenting
justice's "distributor"-based argument-the Doe court is among the few that takes seriously
the failure-to-remove category, rather than the distributor category. Nonetheless, Doe
predates Batzel and other courts' debates about the active/passive distinction and simply
does not address the relevance of the affirmative duty categories for § 230 analysis.
Additionally, because Doe involves asserted liability for harm caused by the posting of child
pornography- and not libel -it is not dear whether the § 230 should apply at all. Relatedly,
there is reason to wonder whether the First Amendment arguments that might undercut
notice-based distributor-based liability for libel (even absent § 230(c)) would, under common
law and constitutional law, shield ISPs against distributor-liability in connection with child
pornography.
n See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
2 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative [ntent, 91 VA. L. REv. 419, 434-36
(2005) (explaining the nature of textualists); see also Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia's Equitable
Constitution, 33 J.C. & U.L 143, 144 (2007) (describing the reading process for constitutions
and statutes).
210 See Manning, supra note 209, at 434-36 (discussing the reasoning as to why statutory
language is read by textualists).
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will not be converted into a successful affirmative duty argument by
adding that there was an undertaking to restrict or censor. The starting
assumption of that argument appears to be that there is no affirmative
duty of ISPs (or their Board Leaders or hired monitors) to remove
defamatory statements from their own websites; the failure to remove
them cannot be taken as a basis for liability under section 577(2)
(affirmative duty of owner or property or chattels to remove defamatory
statement). And so, one is led to ask whether there is anything in the text
of § 230 that can be read as expressing that proposition.
The answer is simply that the text of § 230(c)(1) is very naturally read
as expressing that point: "No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider." 211 The question
presented by Zeran is if a court imposes liability for reputational injury on an
ISP for failure to remove a defamatory statement posted through its bulletin
board, will that court count as having "treated" the ISP as a "publisher or
speaker" of that statement? Judge Wilkinson got the right answer to that
question in Zeran: a court that imposed liability under such circumstances
would be violating § 230, and, therefore, state law is preempted to the
extent that it does S0.212
It is therefore most plausible to read § 230(c)(1), when it demands of
courts that they not "treat" an Internet service provider or user "as a
publisher or speaker" of someone else's posting, as meaning that it not
hold them liable for failure to remove postings from their websites or
bulletin board.213 That is part of what § 230(c)(1) forbids. Because such a
bald statement of no affirmative duty to protect, like tort law's basic
principles of no affirmative duty, leaves open the question of whether an
undertaking to censor and monitor could generate an affirmative duty
(and concomitant liability), § 230(c)(2) shuts the door on the undertaking-
based affirmative duty, too. The Good Samaritan component of the
legislative effort received top billing, presumably because the ISP industry
rationally viewed Stratton Oakmont's almost deliberate punitiveness
toward "family-values" ISPs as the most powerful magnet for
Congressional reform.214 Lobbyists for the industry prudently led with
21 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
212 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 335.
3 See id. at 330 (explaining that § 230 protects service providers from lawsuits if they
should act as publishers).
214 See 141 Cong. Rec. H8460-M1 (1995) (quoting Representative Christopher Cox's
testimony).
38 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.51
the Good Samaritan part, presumably aware that the more basic
protection against liability for failure to remove would come in tow. 215
There is, arguably, a textual advantage to the reading of § 230(c)(1) as
this Article is suggesting, even when the text of § 230(c)(1) is taken on its
own. Notwithstanding the preliminary interpretive hypothesis, the text
of this section is not perfectly interpreted as a simple prohibition on
classifying ISPs as "publishers" akin to newspaper publishers. If that had
been its sole point, it would have been more felicitous simply to state that
an Internet service provider should not be treated as a "publisher."
Instead, it states that an ISP (or user) should not be treated as "the
publisher or speaker [of any information provided by another information
content provider]." The latter two words-"or speaker"-appear
extraneous. If, however, the point of § 230(c)(1) is to block courts from
saying that the "publication" element of a defamation claim is satisfied by
an affirmative duty of a chattels owner to remove statements, then the
phrase "publisher or speaker" makes sense. That is because the
publication element of a defamation claim is nicely captured by the
requirement that the defendant have "written or spoken" defamatory
words. It is the element as a whole that § 230(c)(1) insists is unsatisfied by
Internet service providers and users failing to remove a defamatory
statement on a site over which they have control. The point is that, in
situations where such defamatory statements appear on a site over which
they have control, the defendant's control over the site does not provide a
sufficient basis for treating the defendant as "the publisher or speaker" of
the statements posted on it by third parties -in other words, as fulfilling
the publication requirement of a defamation claim against the ISP or user,
notwithstanding that the defamatory statements were actually made (posted) by
third parties.
Let us return to Zeran. In his opinion, Judge Harvie Wilkinson
reasoned that if ISPs were subject to notice-based liability for failure to
remove defamatory statements:
[Tihey would face potential liability each time they
receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement -
from any party, concerning any message. Each
notification would require a careful yet rapid
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the
posted information, a legal judgment concerning the
information's defamatory character, and an on-the-spot
1 See Melissa A. Troiano, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Law Should
Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447,1463 (2006) (explaining the lobbyist's position
on the Good Samaritan clause in regards to liability).
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editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the
continued publication of that information. Although this
might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, the
sheer number of postings on interactive computer
services would create an impossible burden in the
Internet context.216
An interpretation leading to this result would frustrate Congressional
purpose, he argued. Judge Wilkinson's statement is true, but it
understates the strength of the interpretation and its fidelity to the text; as
this Article has argued, the text of § 230 is best understood as ruling out
the treatment of ISPs as having affirmative duties to filter or remove
defamatory matter. 7 Congress's statement that ISPs should not be
treated as publishers or speakers of statements by other content providers
expresses the idea that the failure to filter or remove the other content, the
provider's statement shall not warrant treating the defendant as if she or he
were the publisher or speaker of that statement in the traditional sense.
On this account, then, section 1 of the Good Samaritan statute is broad
because it prohibits: (1) treating an ISP the same as courts would treat the
publisher or speaker in-the-traditional-sense of a defamatory (or
otherwise tortious) statement on the Internet; and (2) imposing liability on
an Internet service provider or user by virtue of the failure to comply with
an affirmative duty to remove others' statements. Section 2 is in one way
narrower and in one way broader. It is narrower because it relates only to
the "undertaking" line of plaintiff argument, and it is broader because it
goes beyond the phrase "publisher or speaker," and simply asserts that
liability should not be imposed on this basis. In this way, section 2 makes
especially clear that a particular kind of argument for generating an
affirmative duty is preempted.
It is understandable that Mr. Zeran's lawyer ran a distributor
argument against AOL in Zeran, because § 230(c)(1) (if one overlooks the
words "or speaker") appears to overrule Stratton Oakmont by declaring
that ISPs are not to be treated like newspaper publishers. Because
distributors were distinct from publishers and were allegedly deemed to
have some duties to remove postings, and because § 230 does not address
distributors, it was palatable to suggest that § 230 leaves open the
possibility of distributor liability. Judge Wilkinson was inclined to regard
this argument as wrongheaded, believing that the legislation should be
understood as having done more than eliminate pure publisher liability.
216 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
217 See supra Part III.C.
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Judge Wilkinson's pro-ISP inclination was sound, as was his actual
decision in Zeran, but the distributor argument was a distraction. Zeran
was asking the District Court to impose liability upon AOL because of its
failure to remove the post defaming him from AOL's bulletin board.
Nothing about what AOL did was like the action of a distributor; AOL
provided the substratum or chattels through which another person
posted, but it did not itself choose to post anything. Zeran was effectively
asking the court to apply failure-to-remove liability, as in Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 577(2). As we have seen, § 230(c)(1) should be
read as denying the existence of a quasi-property-based affirmative duty
to remove postings. Not only does the text of (c)(1) support that reading,
it is only against that backdrop that the Good Samaritan provision of
§ 230(c)(2) makes sense. It would make no sense to say that undertaking
or volunteering to filter does not alter the background rule of no-
affirmative duty, unless it was first established that there was no baseline
affirmative duty to remove or basis of liability involved in being a
provider or user of the Internet service through which the defamatory
statement was posted by another.
It appears, however, that Judge Wilkinson did not see this argument.
He therefore read the statute according to his understanding of its broader
purpose of enhancing free speech, as preempting tort claims against those
who engage in the act of distributing defamatory statements. The
distinction between distributor-based liability with notice and chattels-
owner based liability for failure to remove was immaterial for the
purposes of Zeran; the Fourth Circuit reached the right result. But the
distinction came to be important because subsequent cases forced courts
to confront the question of what-in light of the statute-was defective
about a claim like Zeran's. The correct answer, this Article has argued, is
that Congress wished to deny that failure to remove from one's property
(or chattels or space) should count as fulfilling the publication element of
a libel claim, in the context of the Internet. Lacking this answer,
subsequent courts have been drawn to the idea that because someone else
was the author of the content, the ISP or user cannot be held liable for
publishing the content. This ultimately led courts down the path of
thinking that § 230 repeals the republication rule.
IV. BATZEL REVISITED
A. The Active/Passive Distinction
Both the Ninth Circuit in Batzel and the California Supreme Court in
Barrett were required to deal with the fact that the key defendants in their
Online Defamation
respective cases were individuals, not ISPs or even websites.218 Both
rightly noted that the CDA refers to "internet service providers and users,"
and in so doing, rules out any interpretation limited to ISPs.219 Because
§ 230 appears to address a targeted problem relating principally to ISPs
and website hosts, the generality is a bit puzzling.220 Batzel pointed out
that a non-ISP (e.g., a website owner or, as in Stratton Oakmont, a putative
independent contractor hired to monitor the ISP) might engage in
censorship or screening or take-down efforts, and, therefore, find herself
being treated by the jurisdiction as a publisher, were the statute worded
only to shield ISPs.221
The larger question in both cases is whether the posting on bulletin
boards or listserves by the individual defendant is shielded from liability
by § 230. Batzel's argument for liability was simple: Cremers libeled her
by e-mailing and posting around a letter stating that she was Himmler's
descendant who secretly possessed art that Nazis had looted from Jews.222
Under the law of libel, given the republication rule, the fact that the letter
was composed by Smith does not undercut Batzel's claim that Cremers
libeled her, for Cremers in fact published Smith's letter (in the traditional
sense of "publish") by circulating it and posting it.
Cremers successfully argued that § 230 preempted Batzel's claim on
the ground that imposing liability here would be treating an Internet
service user as a publisher of information provided by another
information content provider (Smith), and, therefore, contravening
§ 230(c)(1). Here is how the majority - which adopted Cremers's
position -characterized the dissent's position and responded to it:
The partial dissent . .. simultaneously maintains that 1) a
defendant who takes an active role in selecting
information for publication is not immune; and 2)
interactive computer service users and providers who
screen the material submitted and remove offensive
content are immune. These two positions simply cannot
logically coexist.
218 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (establishing the defendant
Rosenthal as a director for the Humantics Foundation for Woman and operator of an Internet
discussion group); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (introducing
the defendant, Cremers, as a specialist in museum security).
9 See Barrett, 146 P.3d at 515 (referring to the text used by § 230(c)(1)); see also Batzel, 333
F.3d at 1037 (discussing the language used in § 230 (c)(1)).
2 See § 230 (underscoring problems that may arise with website hosts and the like).
M See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029.
m Id. at 1021.
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Such a distinction between deciding to publish only
some of the material submitted and deciding not to
publish some of the material submitted is not a viable one.
The scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the
publisher approaches the selection process as one of
inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method
or degree, not substance.2
For several reasons, the majority is too quick to accept Cremers's
critique. First, the court's framing of the issue actually begs a key
question: whether a defendant's failure to remove a defamatory posting
can itself count as publishing. "Such a distinction between deciding to
publish only some of the material submitted and deciding not to publish
some of the material submitted is not a viable one." 4 The problem is in
the parallel phrases "deciding to publish only some" and "deciding not to
publish some . . . ."2 Those phrases - and the entire sentence - are
implicit versions of the following: Such a distinction between deciding to
publish only some of the material submitted (and not to publish the remainder)
and deciding not to publish some of the material submitted (but to publish the
remainder) is not a viable one. The argument, in other words, presupposes
that both sides of the comparison involve publishing some and declining
to publish the remainder. It therefore seems preposterous to think that
there is a difference in the order of how it is phrased.
The problem is that the dissent is not arguing for this distinction, but
for a different one -a distinction between choosing to post (some, but not all,
of the material written by third parties) and declining to remove (some, but not
all, of the material written by third parties). The majority simply assumes that
"declining to remove" what is posted on one's website is a form of
publication and that what both sides of the majority's supposedly false
contrast are assumed to be forms of "publishing" third party content
Since there is, as the dissent recognizes, no liability under § 230 for the
second side of the contrast (what the majority describes as "deciding not
to publish some of the material submitted," and implicitly deciding to
publish the remainder by failing to remove it), there cannot be liability on
the first side of the contrast: deciding to publish some (by posting).
Now we are at the nub of the difficulty. This Article's central
interpretive claim is that § 230(c) specifically rejects the idea that declining
to remove a posting shall count as publishing. Yet the majority in Batzel
begins with the assumption that declining to remove is publishing. That is
M Id. at 1032 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
2 Id. (emphasis in original).
2 Id. (emphasis in original).
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why courts employing broadly pro-defendant interpretations are inclined
to speak of a § 230 "immunity" as if there is a special sort of affirmative
defense or shield against what otherwise is a well-formed prima facie
claim. The plaintiff's whole point is to argue against that equivalence.
Perhaps the argument does not succeed, but the majority needs to show
that it does not succeed; to begin by merely assuming that failure to
remove is a form of publication is viciously circular. That is what the
Ninth Circuit majority does (and then says there is immunity for
publishing something if it was penned by someone else originally).
Second, the court is making plain its contempt for an active/passive
distinction and suggesting that it is sort of a fabrication of the dissent.?
But active/ passive distinctions are all over the law - for better or worse -
and they are indeed central to the black letter law of libel, especially
regarding the publication element."
Third, the account the Article offered above -stretching from Cubby
to Stratton Oakmont and § 230's enactment to Zeran - of course suggests
that preempting passive, affirmative-duty-based liability was precisely
what § 230 was aimed at doing and it explains why. The common law for
very basic reasons holds those who publish defamatory statements liable
for their intentional acts of defaming, and it sweeps in actors as part of the
agency of publishing. No communication happens and no defamation
occurs without the voluntary act of publishing. For powerful reasons
relating to responsibility, choice, and freedom, the common law does not
treat failure to remove what someone else has published, or failure to
screen out what someone else has published, as a general basis for liability
(although, as discussed, there can be exceptions). These are the same
reasons that we treat shooting someone differently from failing to stop the
bullet or failing to rescue the victim. To be pluralistic about it, some
reasons relate to basic notions of agency and responsibility; some relate to
libertarian notions of freedom; some relate to floodgates concerns; some
relate to compliance costs2m
The lawyers for Stratton Oakmont, picking up on a line of thinking in
the legal literature and on overly aggressive marketing statements by
Prodigy, crafted an interesting common law argument for changing the
default rule of no liability for failure to remove without notice; the
undertaking of screening and removal creates an actionable duty to screen
226 See id. at 1038.
22 See supra Part II.A.
m Cf. Myriam Gilles, The Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 65 GA. L. REv. 845,857 (2001) (discussing qualified immunity and
distinguishing negligence torts, which have high compliance costs, from intentional torts,
which have low compliance costs).
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or remove. Combined with a Restatement section 577 argument that
property or chattel owners have duties to remove when they are aware of
the defamatory content of what they are publishing, plaintiffs seemed
poised to convince courts around the country to elide the active/passive
distinction and hold ISPs liable for failure to screen or failure to remove.
As demonstrated in Part 11, the very point of the CDA was to preempt
state courts who wished to elide this distinction in this clever manner. To
do so would be to obliterate the massively important distinction between
monitoring oneself so that one does not utter or write defamatory
statements, on the one hand, and monitoring the statements of everyone
else in the world to decide whether their statements must be blocked or
removed. Congress saw not only that such an obliteration would be unfair
to ISPs, but also that it would incentivize massive overscreening, and
therefore, be a free speech problem.229
Batzel was mistaken in supposing the active/passive distinction
illogical; mistaken in supposing it fabricated, mistaken in supposing it
unmotivated, and mistaken in thinking the distinction alien from
Congress's intentions.2 Section 230-as its name "Good Samaritan
protection" indicates-is all about telling states that they may not
recognize liability predicated on breach of a duty to screen or remove; ISP
screening and removing is incentivized by rendering it a no-liability
activity. It has nothing to do with active posting of materials online.
B. Some Causes of the Batzel Error
Assuming for the moment that this Article is correct in its critique of
the Batzel majority, how could it be that nearly all of the serious federal
and state judges to have addressed the same issue continue to get it wrong,
and why has the problem not been exposed? Possibly, the deepest causes
of the error are jurisprudential; indeed, that will be the topic of Part V of
this Article, but at least three other facets of the legal setting deserve
discussion: one relating to the statutory language of § 230(c)(1), one
relating to a kind of screening issue that arises in some § 230 cases, and
one relating to the republication rule and the common law background.
1. Statutory Language
The language of § 230(c)(1) is mandatory and categorical, and
Cremers's argument appeared to fit it perfectly: "No provider or user of
229 See Zeran v. Am Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,330 (4th Cir. 1997) (providing that Congress
implemented § 230 to reduce infringement on freedom of speech).
m See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1032 (explaining Congress did not require the distinction in § 230
to be present).
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an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider."231
Cremers was a "user of an interactive computer service"; if the Ninth
Circuit had permitted the District Court to hold him liable for libel, that
court would have been treating him "as the publisher of information
provided by" Smith, who was indeed another information provider.
Therefore, a textualist argument seems to be a clean winner for Cremers.
The problem with this argument form is that it proves too much - far
too much. No one would have argued that Cremers would be immune if
he had published the contents of Smith's letter in the New York Times's
hard copy version, but all of the above statements would still be true. The
overbreadth of this interpretation is not cured by saying that it involves
only putative publication on the Internet. There is another problem,
which is that the word "information" is quite naturally interpreted as
meaning the factual content of what the other said, not whether the other
said it, and nothing in the statute requires any attribution to the other
content provider in order to obtain freedom from liability. If Cremers,
going on the information provided by Smith (but with no express
attribution), had written on the Internet "Batzel is Himmler's descendent
and owns a great deal of Nazi looted art," he still would have come within
the text of § 230(c)(1), so interpreted, for the information would still have
been provided by another information content provider. Therefore, the
seemingly straightforward textual reading suggested in the prior
paragraph cannot be right.
It is tempting to suppose - based on these examples - that the statute
is simply poorly drafted. But there is a much more plausible way to
understand it, which lies in the word "treated"; indeed, how courts are
and are not to "treat" ISPs is the central focus of this section of the Article.
The basic idea was that ISPs- which are not in fact publishers in any
straightforward sense, but more like common carriers -should not be
treated as if they were publishers. If an ISP - Google, Inc., for example -
were to make a false and defamatory public statement about one of its
executives based on information a private detective had revealed to it,
Google could certainly be held liable in a libel claim (notwithstanding
§ 230), even if doing so would involve treating Google, Inc. as a publisher
or speaker. That would be because Google, Inc. is a publisher or speaker
in conventional terms, in that hypothetical. Section 230(c)(1) contemplates
a state or federal court that treats an ISP as a publisher or speaker,
notwithstanding its not being one in conventional terms. Doing that is
what a court "shall not" do under § 230(c)(1).
231 47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1) (2012).
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It is a truism that certain legal problems that legislatures might wish
to solve end up leading to drafting that has the capacity to mislead
seriously. Here are two similar, hypothetical, examples:
Consider a statute that reads a certain way (in italics) and an
apparently sound but actually fallacious textual argument in quotation
marks:
(1) No medical radiologic technologist shall be treated as an
expert for the purposes of giving testimony on the standard of
care in a medical malpractice case.
"Jones is a medical radiologic technologist, and therefore
may not serve as an expert witness on the standard of care
in this case, which is a medical malpractice case." The
argument is fallacious if Jones is also a licensed physician
with expertise on the standard of care pertinent to the
case at bar.
OR
(2) No automobile rental company shall be treated as a product-
seller for purposes of products liability law.
Hertz is an automobile rental company, and therefore
cannot be held liable in a products liability case based on
a rental car that injured the plaintiff. The argument is
fallacious if Hertz has created a subsidiary that is actually
a retailer of new automobiles, and the plaintiff was
injured by such an automobile.
The general form is:
No member of class C shall be treated as having the attribute
Alpha for the purposes of body of law Beta.
Such statutes can be interpreted in a range of ways. At one end of the
range is: Sufficient for exclusion: If a person or a company is a member of
class C, then, for that very reason, courts interpreting the body of law Beta may
not treat that person or company as having the attribute Alpha, under body of law
Beta. At the other end of the range is: Rejection of inclusion criterion: Body
of law Beta shall not be interpreted in such a way that membership in class C is
grounds for treating a person or company as having attribute Alpha, under body
of law Beta.
In both examples (1) and (2) above, it would very likely be wrong to
read the statute as containing a criterion that is, in and of itself, sufficient
for exclusion from treatment as having Alpha, and it would much likelier
make sense to see the statute as rejecting a certain kind of criterion as a
20161 Online Defamation 47
primary basis for inclusion in treatment as having Alpha. These examples
are quite simple, and I am of course assuming that there was context in
each of my examples -textual, historical, or otherwise that would make
clear why the "rejection of inclusion criterion" reading was better (in (1),
I imagine a doctor's lobby persuading a state legislature that the barrier
for counting as an expert in medical malpractice cases was getting too low
and insufficiently attentive to norms of care among physicians; in (2), I
imagine a trend of plaintiffs' lawyers trying to circumvent negligence law
standards in litigation against rental companies who rent defective cars
and a legislature blocking the trend).
Taken to the CDA, the point is as follows: there is no basis for
interpreting the statute to read that being an Internet service provider or user
is sufficient to exclude a defendant from being potentially liable for republishing
someone else's statements, rather than reading it to say that being the service
or medium through which it was posted (or having control over the service or
medium through which it was posted by another) shall not be a basis for treating
the ISP (or user) as a publisher -i.e., deeming the publication element satisfied
The name and repeated usage of the phrase "Good Samaritan," the
express reference to Stratton Oakmont, the common law background, the
legislative history, and the canon of reading narrowly statutes in
derogation of the common law - all cut in favor of the second reading and
against the first.
Here, as elsewhere, courts must interpret the statute as a whole.2 3 2
2. Screening Protection
According to § 230(c)(2):
[N]o provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of (A) any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable ... .233
In Donato v. Moldow, the New Jersey Appellate Division confronted a
claim against the operator of a website who edited a third party's
defamatory content in such a way as to diminish its profanity, then
232 See Utility Air Reg. Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. CL 2427, 2442-43 (2014) (establishing when
interpreting text, the statute must be read as a whole); see also Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131
S. CL 1068,1082 (2011).
m § 230 (c)(2).
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reposted the edited post.23 4 The defendant operator argued that to hold
him liable for reposting what was done in the service of screening out
profanity was to violate § 230(c)(2), which seems to be devoted to
encouraging web users to do some censoring or editing of profanities.2
Although Batzel was decided before Donato, and relied upon within it, an
aspect of the decision contemplated that Smith had sent Cremers his e-
mail for the purpose of having it posted, and that Cremers simply served
as an intermediary who did some good faith editing.z6 Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit actually remanded Batzel's claim to the District Court to ascertain
whether this was true, in other words, whether Cremers was simply an
intermediary who performed a good faith editing function.237 The case
lost on summary judgment because of unrelated procedural difficulties
faced by Batzel.m
In the end, this line of argument-which also appears in Shiamili and
Jones -is largely unpersuasive in the vast majority of cases in which it
appears (including Batzel, Donato, and Shiamili), and is probably quite
irrelevant in any event to the current state of the law. 239 The California
Supreme Court's decision in Barrett simply did not carry this "editor"
feature; Rosenthal was not using her own website, and the unanimous
court did not even notice the difference. 240 In Batzel, it was clear that even
if Cremers did post the Smith letter on his own website, in edited form, he
2 See Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 713-15 (N.J. Super. 2005).
2 See § 230(c)(2) (permitting editing and restricting materials on a good faith basis without
implication of liability).
26 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding the publisher
should be potentially liable because he published defamatory statements made by third
parties and "a reasonable person in the position of the service provider or user would
conclude that the information was provided for publication on the Internet or other
'interactive computer service'"); see also, e.g., Donato, 865 A.2d at 718 (showing state courts
should give considerable weight to federal decisions when interpreting federal statutes).
2 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035.
2 See Batzel v. Smith, 372 F. Supp. 2d 546, 546 (C.D. Cal 2005) (granting summary
judgment on res judicata, because of dismissal for failure to prosecute in parallel North
Carolina action).
239 See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 396, 415-17 (6th Cir.
2014) (holding that immunity is triggered when a service provider exercises a publisher's
traditional editorial functions); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (concluding no provider or user of an
interactive computer service can be treated as the publisher provided by another content
provider); Donato, 865 A.2d at 718 (reiterating that state courts should give regard to federal
decisions when interpreting federal statutes); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y. Inc., 17
N.Y.3d 281, 286-87 (N.Y. 2011) (explaining that a publisher of defamatory material authored
by a third party is generally subject to tort liability, but there is an exception in which the
defendant is an information content provider).
240 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 526, 528-29 (Cal 2006) (reiterating that Congress
intended active users on the Internet to be immune from tort liability because of their
freedom to actively post material on the Internet).
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also passed the email and the email's information to other persons via
other means, so the conduit argument fails.241 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the statutory language follows typical Good Samaritan
statutes by including a "good faith" requirement.242 Plausible and
evidence-backed contentions that the website operators intentionally,
recklessly, maliciously, or knowingly made defamatory and false
statements quite easily create an issue as to "good faith," notwithstanding
the Donato court's dismissive comments to the contrary.243
3. Established Modes of Cabining the Republication Rule
In the third place, a common misreading of § 230 appears to draw
from the fair reporting privilege and other sources of legal doctrine
unrelated to the CDA.244 The rule sometimes appears harsh, unjust, and
indefensible -a point most eloquently and powerfully expressed by the
Second Circuit's famous decision in Edwards v. National Audubon Society,
Inc.245 Edwards utilized the First Amendment to fashion what it called the
"neutral reportage privilege," which essentially created a space of no
liability when a responsible speaker accurately conveyed the gist of a
defamatory statement by another person, perhaps a public figure, at least
where the fact of the third party's utterance was itself a matter of
legitimate public concern.246 Although Edwards has never been endorsed
by the Supreme Court and has received a mixed reception, nationally, it
241 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1022 (observing that Cremers included the message in emails to
several persons).
242 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012) ("No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of- (A) any action voluntarily
taken in good faith") (emphasis added).
243 See Donato, 865 A.2d at 727 (addressing the "good faith" requirement of the good
Samaritan provision). The Court addressed the appellant's argument based on the
following-
In our view, appellants' argument rests on a misconception about the
purpose of the good samaritan provision. It was inserted not to
diminish the broad general immunity provided by § 230(c)(1), but to
assure that it not be diminished by the exercise of traditional publisher
functions. If the conduct falls within the scope of the traditional
publisher's functions, it cannot constitute, within the context of
§ 230(c)(2)(A), bad faith.
Id. The failure of the New Jersey court to take seriously the role of "good faith" in Good
Samaritan statutes generally is quite striking.
244 See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS, 1
§ 7.3 (4th ed. 2014) (explaining "Limitations on and Exceptions to Liability" under
republication doctrine).
245 See 556 F.2d 113,122-23 (2nd Cir. 1977).
246 See id. at 120 (explaining that personal attacks against a public figure will not be able to
be immune under neutral reportage).
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echoes a common law or statutory privilege that exists in many
jurisdictions: the fair-and-accurate reporting privilege.247 The privilege
typically states that a newspaper or news source may publish "fair and
accurate reports of certain defined judicial, legislative, and executive
proceedings." 248 Both neutral reportage and fair reporting are very
limited, and each requires an accurate and balanced report, as well as
many other features. 249 Anything beyond the accurate and balanced
report will normally defeat the privilege. 250 As a matter of practice,
however, courts adjudicating such cases are typically going to focus on
what differences exist, if any, between the statement by the third party
and the statement by the defendant. For the reasons explained below, a
defamatory-difference-in-content test seems to have caught on in CDA
case law.
Section 230(f)(3) states that " [t]he term 'information content provider'
means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service." Following Judge Frank
Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit, many jurisdictions have taken
§ 230(f)(3) in conjunction with § 230(c)(1) to entail that an ISP or user is not
the publisher of a statement made by a third party unless the defamatory
content was provided in significant part by the ISP or user herself.251 That
is, whatever was provided in whole by the third party is something of
which the ISP or user cannot be considered a "publisher." 252 With this
argument in mind, a thoughtful line of cases now looks at whether the
republisher has added independent content; in this case, there can be
liability that is not for information content supplied by a third party, but
247 See SACK, supra note 244, at § 7.3.5.D.3, at 7-50 ("lower state and federal courts, the
reception has been generally favorable but not unmixed"); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs § 611 (AM. LAW INsT. 1976) (providing that a publication of defamatory matter is
privileged if "the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence
reported"); Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
248 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 2 § 8:66 (2d ed. 2010).
249 See id. at 2 § 8:67 (explaining the fair reporting privilege is more often than not
considered an exemption to the common law republication rule).
2 See id. (expanding on the concept that the neutral reporting privilege and fair reporting
privileges are exceptions to the normal common law position of the republication rule
because of the public's interest to know about fair and accurate reporting).
251 See § 230(f)(3) (establishing the definition of who is considered an information content
provider); § 230(c)(1) (explaining the treatment to publishers and speakers); Chi. Lawyers'
Comm. for Civil Rights under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2008)
(describing the limitations on how someone can be immune from tort liability).
252 See Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 at 671-72 (stating the stipulations of § 230(c)(1), which
provide that a messenger cannot be sued simply because a message depicts a third party's
plan related to unlawful discriminatory practices).
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supplied by the defendant independently. 253 In my view, part of the
success of the mistaken interpretation of the CDA is that it does provide
courts with a cogent and comprehensible test in an Internet libel case, one
that is accompanied by the perhaps familiar sense that one is doing a fair
and accurate reporting type of analysis.25
The central error in this argument is the one that Part IV.A identifies
and Part IV.B.1 deepens. Section 230 is not about the impermissibility of
treating speakers as publishers when they are in fact simply acting as
publishers in the traditional sense. To think otherwise is to suppose that
the CDA was put forward to undo the republication rule for the Internet
at a wholesale level. There is simply nothing in the statute's text or
legislative history that suggests that it has anything to do with an effort to
eliminate liability for republishing. Indeed, we have seen that taking the
statute in this way is something of a blunder, for the real issue is not
whether an ISP will be on the hook as a republisher, but whether the
original publication by a third party will somehow be a publication for
which the ISP is held responsible by virtue of providing the medium or
failing to remove it. Republication liability is certainly an interesting,
important, and potentially controversial topic, but it is not what § 230 is
about.2ss The fact that § 230 expressly aimed to change the result in
253 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to extend immunity to a federal housing discrimination claim).
Roommates.com famously declines to interpret § 230 as undercutting a federal housing
discrimination claim, finding that the website's involvement was sufficient to overcome the
statutory shield. See id. (analyzing a website's immunity under § 230). By contrast, while the
District Court in Jones found that the website owner's involvement and commentary were
sufficient to overcome § 230, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court as a matter of law
on this issue. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 415-17
(demonstrating why Dirty World and Richie did not materially contribute to the illegality of
the defamation statements towards Jones).
2 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (explaining a website operator who changes user-
created content holds onto his immunity for anything illegal in the user-created content, as
long as the edits are unrelated to the illegality).
2 See Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 669-70 (explaining the controversies and issues that have
influenced § 230(c)). Judge Easterbrook's well-known Craigslist opinion expressly draws
from his own influential opinion in Doe v. GTE Corp. See id. at 669 (citing Doe v. GTE Corp.)
That opinion surprisingly fails to take seriously the odd structure of duty-to-
rescue/nonfeasance law that lies behind Good Samaritan statutes:
If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs indifferent
to the content of information they host or transmit whether they do
(subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is
no liability under either state or federal law. As precautions are costly,
not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue from the filtered
customers, ISPs may be expected to take the do-nothing option and
enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet § 230(c)-which is, recall, part of
the "Communications Decency Act"-bears the title "Protection for
'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material", hardly
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Stratton Oakmont simply does not entail that it addressed the question of
republication; it did not. To abrogate a common-law principle, the statute
must "speak directly" to the question addressed by the common law.2
Indeed, the Internet is such an amazing tool for broad dissemination
that it would be a particularly bizarre policy judgment to eliminate the
republication rule for the Internet, but for no other medium. Do we really
think Congress meant to say that, while republication of defamatory
material in print or by word of mouth remains actionable, any
republication over the Internet is not? If this were the best reading of
§ 230, we would find a way to live with it or perhaps amend it, but it is
not the best reading; it is a reading that relies upon a reductive and
incomplete picture of the legal domain into which § 230 was expressly
placed.
V. LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE COMMON LAW
Beyond the considerations mentioned above, Batzel perhaps displays
a tendency to suppose that distinctions like active/passive and concepts
like that of "publication" have no real normative work to do - that, in the
end, it is a question of whether we value free speech more than protecting
reputation in a given context. Tort law-including libel law-is not so
blunt. It does not simply weigh one person's demand for compensation
against expected policy results. It looks at who has done what to whom,
but there is nuance in the "who," in what they have "done" to someone,
and to "whom," and in what sense they have "done" that. All of this goes
into whether the legal system is willing to allow an aggrieved person to
hold another accountable for wronging her or him. The who, the how,
and the whom are not of course decided as a one-shot deal; they are
an apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing
about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their
services. Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs' liability to the
creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of
tortious or criminal conduct?
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
The account I have provided in the text answers Judge Frank Easterbrook's question.
The point of Section 1 is to confirm the baseline nonfeasance/misfeasance rule for
defamation and the Internet, and to ensure that there is no duty-to-remove based on the
capacity to remove, the ownership of the chattels through which it is posted, or the common
carrier function. Section 2 is designed to ensure that the default no-duty/no liability rule is
not changed by a practice of censorship. Section 230(c)(2) is not about liability to those whose
postings are removed, but about liability to those who are defamed (or otherwise injured) by
virtue of what a third party posted.
a See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (arguing that the terminology used
in the statute must adhere to common law standards to be utilized with common law
standards).
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decided according to a set of categories and principles in the legal system
that, roughly speaking, coalesce into a set of rules. The system is not clear-
cut, however, and the rules are changeable, both by courts and by
legislatures.
Part of what might be called, if somewhat pretentiously, "the
normative theory of adjudication in the common law," is stating what sort
of approach judges should employ when trying to adjust the common law
to new circumstances, including new technologies. In the twentieth
century, a certain brand of Legal Realism derived from one version of
Holmes has clearly led the way in torts. On this view, legal categories and
concepts are overwhelmingly likely to be convenient instruments for
pursuing policy goals more effectively and efficiently. Indeed, on this
view, which is sometimes referred to as "Reductive Instrumentalism,"
legal concepts are best understood by grasping how they directly and
indirectly serve the goals the law is seeking. A good judge trying to decide
how to extend a legal concept or principle will mainly be aiming to see
what impact that concept has on the basic policy aims of the law, then
applying the concept in a manner that faithfully pursues those policy aims
under the new circumstances.
A person who saw legal actors making reductive instrumental choices
would see things this way: In Stratton Oakmont, the question of whether
Prodigy was a publisher was essentially equivalent - for Justice Ain - to
the question of whether the prevention of reputational harm and the
compensation of those reputationally harmed would be effectively
pursued by holding Prodigy responsible as publisher. The alleged
unfairness of imposing such liability and responsibility on Prodigy was,
in effect, blunted by Prodigy's own boasting about its capacities to
monitor.257 It was as if Prodigy set itself up to be selected as the cheapest
cost avoider.3 The questions of whether Stratton Oakmont's suit fulfilled
the publication requirement and whether Prodigy was a publisher, are
essentially answered by reverse engineering from this set of policy
preferences.
On this instrumentalist understanding, Congress weighed in with the
CDA, and because, as an institutional matter and a constitutional matter,
Congress's preferences trump, its evaluation displaced the rule in Stratton
Oakmont and other courts applying state law. And its evaluation was that
the compensation and deterrence values are outweighed by the free
speech values. Therefore, ISPs and users are not to be held liable for the
defamatory statements of others. In Batzel, there is a formal difference
257 Supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
2 Cf GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENIS (1970) (setting forth cheapest-cost-
avoider theory of tort law).
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between whether the defendant placed or removed others' defamatory
statements, but the difference is neither here nor there from a
compensation, deterrence, and incentives point of view, as Justice Ain
thought, and the free speech trumping announced by Congress is still the
biggest value out there.
Needless to say, I think this chronology is at once accurate and self-
condemning. It was quite aggressive and counterintuitive to hold that
Prodigy would be liable for Stratton Oakmont's reputational injury,
because it made no sense to say that Prodigy was the publisher of those
reputational attacks, especially as a matter of law. Conversely, Congress
may have gone overboard when it explained that ISPs and their users may
never be held responsible for the statements that third parties have posted
and may never be liable for the damage caused by such statements.
Certainly, Zeran's result was harsh, and AOL's conspicuous failure to take
responsibility for an ongoing character assassination that it could have
stopped was disconcerting, but it is plausible that the statute meant to
foreclose that sort of liability.259 Yet, by Batzel and Barrett, we have come
full circle. The defendants in those cases were actually posting
defamatory statements about the plaintiffs - spreading reputational harm
by voluntary intentional actions of communication to third parties.260 The
thing Stratton Oakmont pretended that Prodigy was doing-actually
publishing something negative about it-is exactly what Cremers and
Rosenthal were doing in those cases.
There is a jurisprudential lesson to be drawn from this story.261 Legal
concepts and legal principles have content. They are not always rightly
used and they are not always comfortable, but they aspire to track
perfectly sensible moral concepts and principles that are largely workable
in daily life. We hold other people responsible for what they have done,
for ways they have hurt us, and we act with the understanding that others
may hold us responsible, too. The common law developed in tandem with
25 See Zeran v. Ant Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,330, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing there
would be public policy concerns if service providers were subject to distributor liability).
26 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that Smith emailed
the Director of Security at Amsterdam's Rijksmuseum about Ellen Batzel having hundreds
of European paintings that were looted during World War II, and then Cremers published
Smith's email to the Museum Security Network); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513-14
(Cal. 2006) (discussing Rosenthal republished various messages about the plaintiffs, even
after Rosenthal was told they were false).
261 See Zipursky, Pragmatic, supra note 4, at 458-59 (explaining how conceptualistic analysis
of law is consistent with philosophical pragmatism and the rejection of formalism).
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these non-legal concepts of responsibility, and these non-legal concepts of
responsibility continue to evolve.262
Of course, the CDA cases we have reviewed are not exactly cases in
the common law of torts; they are statutory interpretation cases, rightly
rooted in text and purpose more than in common law concepts. We have
already seen, however, that untutored textual interpretation and
simplistic, goal-centered purposive interpretation can easily go awry. A
statutory idea that is inserted into an area of state common law should of
course be read with a background framework for the common law, and
that is what I - as a scholar of the common law of torts - have tried to
provide. When we understand the affirmative duty and 'commenced
rescue' ideas that come from the common law of negligence, the Good
Samaritan statutes used to adjust that law, and the analogous
misfeasance/nonfeasance that arise in libel law, we arrive closer to the
common law sophistication that being a good interpreter requires.
VI. CONCLUSION
The task of a common law judge crafting legal concepts and principles
is to get the hang of what they mean and also to think sensibly and
pragmatically about how the legal concepts and principles can be applied
moving forward. But thinking pragmatically does not mean thinking
instrumentally in a manner that simply contemplates a reductive
conception of social goals. Rather, the common law judge must think
pragmatically without losing a grip on the concepts and principles;
indeed, thinking pragmatically is typically an integral part of deploying
the concepts and principles well. And -as cases from Zeran to Barrett
indicate -an understanding of how statutory law fits with the common
law will typically require a supple and pragmatic grasp of the concepts
within the common law, too.
The common law of torts is in principle, available to protect
individuals against every level of injury, and-as New York Times v.
Sullivan and its progeny have shown-can be ratcheted up and down
depending on our perceptions of the social costs of liability. Twenty-two
years ago, a patently criminal enterprise - Stratton Oakmont - filed a silly
libel suit in a Long Island state court, and a local judge threw caution to
the wind and let the case proceed. Fortunately, the United States Congress
inserted a protective provision into federal law that ensured such
decisions would not chill the development of Internet speech by rendering
262 See JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPuRSKy, TORT LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY, IN
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw (I. Oberdiek ed., 2014) (analyzing place of
responsibility in tort law).
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ISPs' deep pockets for a million slights per hour. But, nothing in that law
said "all speech tort law stops here," and Congress knew then what we all
know now -that the world of the Internet would develop in ways then
unimaginable. This is just the sort of change that calls for thoughtful
interpretation, not total immunity.
